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LESSONS FROM THE PAST: THE VENETIAN 
REPUBLIC’S TAILORING OF PATENT 
PROTECTION TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE INVENTION 
Stefania Fusco* 
ABSTRACT—In recent years, much discussion in patent law has revolved 
around granting tailored protection to provide better incentives to inventors 
in different industries and to increase patent quality. For example, the 
deliberations that led to the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (AIA) focused specifically on the role of the patent system in different 
industries as well as on modifying remedies and patent terms to reflect the 
needs of distinct technology sectors. Whereas in the literature there seems 
to be substantial agreement on the fact that tailored protection would be 
beneficial for the effectiveness of the patent system, there is no consensus 
with respect to which entity should be vested with the authority to produce 
tailored patent policies, standards, and rules based on the needs of the 
various industries. Currently, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) are the two principal candidates for this role. Some of this debate 
is connected to the broader issue in legal academia of granting general 
regulatory authority to administrative agencies with highly specialized 
knowledge. Contrary to other administrative agencies, such as the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), Congress has never granted such authority to the 
USPTO; scholars have criticized this inconsistency. The strongest 
argument that patent experts, such as Jonathan Masur and Sarah Tran, have 
used to question the current status of the USPTO refers to the fact that 
much could be gained from the information that this agency has 
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accumulated through years of experience working with inventors in 
different industries, particularly with respect to tailoring patent protection. 
Historically, the Venetian Republic provided tailored patent protection 
based on the characteristics of the invention. In that context, the entity 
entrusted with the power to tailor the protection granted in each case was 
the Senate, the issuing authority. Moreover, although the Venetian 
Republic enacted what is widely recognized as the first Patent Act in the 
world in 1474, the Venetian Senate continued its practice of granting 
tailored patents until the end of the Republic in 1797. In fact, as explained 
by Luigi Sordelli in 1974, following the enactment of the 1474 Act, 
inventors could obtain protection in Venice in two ways: through the newly 
created statutory system or through the much older customary system of 
senatorial grants. Conclusive evidence that Sordelli’s view was correct is 
provided in a separate paper that I co-authored with Ted Sichelman and 
Toni Veneri, in which we shed important new light on the true origin of 
patent law. In this article, I focus instead on tailoring patent protection. 
Specifically, I use original documents from the Venetian State Archives to 
present a detailed account of how the Venetian Republic used its 
customary patent system to tailor protection to the unique characteristics 
of an invention. 
Furthermore, I provide a full analysis of what can be learned from the 
Venetian experience to inform the modern debate on tailoring patent 
protection. Until now, only two other legal scholars have conducted 
extensive examinations of the original Venetian patents: Ted Sichelman 
and Sean O’Connor. The Venetian patent system appears to have been a 
very successful one; it operated for more than 300 years and during the 
16th century helped Venice to transform itself from being a nation of 
sailors to being a nation of artisans and engineers, and ultimately the center 
of technological development in Europe. Thus, the Venetian customary 
patent system offers important lessons on how tailored patent protection 
and higher patent quality can be achieved. An accurate description of this 
system is crucial to further understanding the specific steps that we should 
take to reach these goals today. 
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Is the U.S. patent system providing the optimal level of protection to 
all of the industries that it covers? At least in theory, patent law in the 
United States provides uniform, technology-neutral protection to all kinds 
of inventions.1 This is true, notwithstanding the fact that technology is 
definitely not uniform.2 Consequently, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argued 
in 2003 that there is no reason to believe that our current patent system is 
performing optimally.3 In fact, according to Burk and Lemley, patent 
protection should be tailored to the characteristics of the respective 
industries.4 Prior to the work of Burk and Lemley, other scholars had 
proposed a tailored patent system,5 but it was following their contribution 
that the debate on this issue became substantial in the United States. While 
there appears to be some consensus among patent scholars on the question 
 
 1 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 1579. 
 5 See, e.g., Himanshu S. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software Under the Current 
Intellectual Property Laws, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 19 (1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common 
Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 
(1997); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN L. REV. 1329 
(1987); John C. Phillips, Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 997 (1992); Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislative Protecting 
Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131 (1986); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case 
Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY 
L.J. 1025 (1990). 
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of whether tailored protection would be beneficial to enhancing the 
effectiveness of the patent system, there is no agreement about how to 
achieve this result and, in particular, about which entity should be vested 
with the authority to produce tailored patent policies, standards and rules 
based on the needs of the various industries.6 Burk and Lemley explained in 
their paper that their preference would be for the courts to conduct the 
tailoring activity in patent law.7 However, they concluded that this task 
could also be assigned to other entities such as the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).8 Ultimately, the two principal candidates for 
this role in the literature currently seem to be the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the USPTO.9 
Part of this debate is connected to the broader issue in legal academia 
of granting general regulatory authority to administrative agencies with 
highly specialized knowledge. Contrary to other administrative agencies, 
such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), Congress has never granted such 
authority to the USPTO—an inconsistency often criticized by scholars.10 
The strongest argument that patent experts, such as Jonathan Masur and 
Sarah Tran, have used to condemn the current status of the USPTO refers 
to the fact that much could be gained from the information that this agency 
has accumulated through years of experience working with inventors in 
different industries, particularly when it comes to tailoring patent 
protection.11 
In contrast, the Venetian government began providing tailored patent 
protection at the beginning of the 15th century12 when the desire for new 
technologies and methodologies of production in the Republic became 
 
 6 See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT. (2009) (arguing that the court should play a central role in patent policy); Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 1 (arguing that the Federal Circuit is essential to patent policy); Jonathan S. Masur, 
Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (2010) (arguing for a Congressional grant of substantive 
rulemaking authority to the PTO as a central step toward more efficient patent policy); Sarah Tran, 
Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487 (2012) (arguing that the USPTO 
should play a central role in patent policy). 
 7 Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630 (“We argue that the courts must embrace their role in 
making the unitary patent system work for widely divergent industries.”). 
 8 Id. at 1696 (“In the case of patents, the PTO is an actor to consider, with what may be an expanding 
role in shaping the application of the statute.”). 
 9 Id. at 1633 (“Scholars have variously argued that the Federal Circuit should defer to the PTO or 
conversely that the PTO should defer to the Federal Circuit.”). 
 10 See Masur, supra note 6. 
 11 Id. at 304-11. 
 12 Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Origins of 
Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1271 (2012). 
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noteworthy.13 In fact, the appetite for new knowledge at that time likely 
have prompted the Venetian government to grant privileges to those 
artisans and inventors—foreigners, in particular—who were willing to 
bring their expertise to Venice.14 Ultimately, an elaborate system of 
protection for inventions was created, and the first patent act in the world 
was enacted in 1474 (the “1474 Act”).15 
After the introduction of the 1474 Act, as explained by Luigi Sordelli 
in 1974, the Venetian Republic had two systems of patent protection: 
statutory and customary.16 For the purpose of studying the tailoring of 
patent protection, the Venetian customary system is significant, because it 
represented the system that dispensed grants based on the unique 
characteristics of the invention. In other words, this was the system used to 
tailor patent protection through the conferral of terms and penalties that 
were not determined a priori, as under the statutory system, but were 
instead, decided by the Venetian Senate (the “Senate”) for each invention 
at the time of issuance, respectively.17 
How did the Senate determine which term and penalty to grant in each 
case? In this article, I use original documents from the Venice State 
Archive to show that the Venetian Republic provided different terms and 
penalties based on the unique characteristics of the invention, including the 
industry to which the invention belonged. I reached this conclusion by 
analyzing all the customary patents issued by the Senate between 1560 and 
1580. In particular, the investigation revealed that during the relevant time 
period, inventions in the Water and Energy industry received, on average, 
more protection than inventions in other industries. As will be explained in 
this article, possible explanations for the higher level of protection granted 
to inventions in these two industries relate to Venice’s location and the 
specific historical circumstances in which such grants were made. 
This article describes an important historical example of tailored 
patent protection provided by the issuing authority, the Venetian Senate, to 
different inventions. It raises the question of what can be learned from the 
Venetian experience to provide better incentives to inventors in different 
fields, as well as to increase patent quality. Finally, it inquires whether we 
should redesign the role of the USPTO. As mentioned, in recent years 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Luigi Sordelli, Interesse Sociale e Progresso Tecnico Nella “Parte” Veneziana del 19 Marzo 
1474 Sulle Privative Agli Inventori, 23 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 358, 358-410 (1974) (It.) 
[hereinafter Sordelli, Interesse Sociale]. 
 17 Id. 
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numerous scholars have criticized the current role of the USPTO, arguing 
that Congress should provide general rule-making authority in patent law to 
this administrative agency similar to the authority provided to other 
administrative agencies in their respective fields.18 However, other scholars 
have opposed granting more power to the USPTO both because of its past 
record of inefficiencies and the possibility of agency capture.19 While the 
issue of past USPTO inefficiencies could be quickly resolved with the 
allocation of more funding to this entity, the problem of agency capture is 
more complex.20 Thus, the need to study the way in which the Venetian 
Senate efficiently provided tailored patent protection becomes imperative. 
In fact, it seems unlikely that the Venetian Senate operated completely 
immune to external influences. Notwithstanding this possible limitation, the 
Senate managed to create a successful system of protection that lasted more 
than three centuries and enabled Venice to become the dominant European 
city of that time. Furthermore, the same patent system was later adopted as 
a model throughout Europe and reached the United States in the eighteenth 
century. Thus, the history of Venetian patent protection seems to indicate 
that it is possible to effectively address the agency capture problem that 
might permeate the activity of the issuing authority. At a minimum, as 
Sarah Tran suggested, it appears that it could be used to benefit the system, 
rather than harm it.21 This benefit could be achieved by using the 
interaction with lobbyists to acquire additional important information about 
the characteristics and requirements of the various industries.22 
Part I of the article provides the necessary background information for 
this research. Specifically, it discusses the history of the Venetian Republic 
and briefly explains how patent protection was provided in Venice between 
the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries. Part II describes the investigation 
conducted at the State Archive in Venice and its results, paying particular 
attention to the industry-specific analysis and the way in which the terms 
and penalties of the patent were granted by the Senate to different 
inventions. Part III highlights the implications of this study for modern 
 
 18 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT, supra 
note 6, at 106-07; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1559, 1575-78 (2006); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1984 (2009); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 675, 686 (2009); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s 
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2054 (2009); Ryan Vacca, Acting Like 
an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 754-55 (2011). 
 20 See Masur, supra note 6, at 301-02, 312-15 (describing the complexity of agency capture 
critiques of the PTO). 
 21 Tran, supra note 6, at 529-32. 
 22 Id. 
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patent systems in terms of both the possibility of using the Venetian 
experience as a guide to provide tailored patent protection today, as well as 
the need to reconsider the USPTO role in this context. Finally, the 
conclusion presents some suggestions for the work that could be 
undertaken in future studies with respect to tailoring patent protection and 
improving patent quality. 
I. PATENT LAW BETWEEN THE 15TH AND 18TH CENTURIES IN 
THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC 
The Venetian Senate began issuing ad hoc patents, privilegi 
(translated into English, privileges), to protect technological inventions in 
1416.23 Subsequently, on March 19, 1474, the Venetian Republic enacted 
what is widely recognized to be the first patent act in the world with a large 
majority (116 for, ten against, and three abstentions).24 The 1474 Act 
 
 23 See Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 363 (“L’aver impiegato la forma del privilegio, 
del resto usuale in quell tempo a Venezia anche per alter materie (ad esempio per concessioni di 
cittadinanza), stava a significare l’impiego di un modo formale già conosciuto e che rispondesse ad 
esigenze di dettare disposizioni caso per caso, come nella specie ricorreva in tema di invenzioni, per 
dare ai richiedenti facoltà particolari.” [“Using the form of the privilege, which, after all, was typical 
also for other subject matters at that time in Venice (for example for granting citizenship), meant to 
adopt a known, formal way to respond to the need for regulating case-by-case, like in the case of 
inventions, and give petitioners special powers.”]); infra Part I.B The Origin of Patent Protection. See 
also Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 371 (“Queste notazioni servono a spiegare una 
situazione concreta esistente nei secoli dal XIII al XV ed al XVI a Venezia . . . in quel period fosse 
usuale servirsi dello strumento del privilegio . . . per far sorgerere in capo ai richiedenti dei diritti 
esculsivi con poteri di escludere terzi per l’attuazione di macchine, meccanismi, artifici che 
costituiscono cioe trovati aventi . . . le caratteristiche di invenzioni.” [“These remarks are necessary to 
explain a concrete situation which was present in Venice between the 13th and 15th century and the 
16th century . . . when it was common to use the privilege tool to grant petitioners exclusive rights with 
the power to exclude third parties to make machines, mechanisms, artifices which constitute discoveries 
. . . having the characteristics of inventions.”]). 
 24 See, e.g., ROBERTO BERVEGLIERI, INVENTORI STRANIERI A VENEZIA, 1474-1788: IMPORTAZIONE 
DI TECNOLOGIA E CIRCOLAZIONE DI TECNICI ARTIGIANI INVENTORI. REPERTORIO (1995) (It.); ROBERT 
P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW POLICY: CASE AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2013); Luca 
Molà, Il Mercato delle Innovazioni nell’Italia del Rinascimento, in LE TECHNICIEN DANS LA CITÉ EN 
EUROPE OCCIDENTALE 1250-1650 (Mathieux Arnoux & Pierre Monnet eds., 2004) (Fr.); CRAIG A. 
NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 11 (3d ed. 2014); John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of 
Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007); Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity—The Roadblock to 
Democracy? 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 799, 805 (2006); Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, 
“Intellectual Property” and the Origin of Patents: Notes Towards a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & 
CULTURE 846, 878 (1991); Giulio Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), 34 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 511 (1936) (It.), translated in Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents 
(1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948); Giulio Mandich, Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziana di 
un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, 7 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 101 (1958) (It.), translated 
in Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors’ Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378 (1960); 
Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New Technologies, Legal Innovation and the Institutional 
Origins of Intellectual Property, 20 PROMETHEUS 159, 160 (2002); Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra 
note 16. 
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conferred the exclusive authority to issue patents in Venice upon an 
administrative body called the Provveditori di Comun.25 Nevertheless, the 
Venetian Senate continued to grant patents to inventors until the end of the 
Republic in 1797.26 Scholars have generally explained this inconsistency in 
two ways. The majority argued that after 1474, patents were granted in 
Venice based on the 1474 Act, or in other words, based on the newly 
established statutory patent system. Specifically, the majority of scholars 
contended that the 1474 Act formalized and superseded the previous, 
customary system of senatorial grants.27 However, they also claimed that 
the statute was loosely applied.28 Consequently, although the 1474 Act 
granted the power to issue patents to the Provveditori di Comun, in 
practice, the Senate continued to serve as the entity that granted patent 
protection based on the criteria codified in the 1474 Act. Moreover, the 
discovery of a few patents issued in full compliance with the 1474 Act, 
notably granted by the Proveditori di Comun, with a ten years term and a 
100 ducats penalty, represented exceptions to what was instead the normal 
application of the statute.29 Alternatively, one other scholar claimed that the 
 
 25 See infra note 69. 
 26 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 376. 
 27 See, e.g., Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 517; 
Mandich, Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziana di un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, supra note 24, at 
134, 143. 
 28 See, e.g., R. Berveglieri & C. Poni, Three Centuries of Venetian Patents 1474-1796, ACTA 
HISTORIAE RERUM NATURALIUM NEC NON TECHNICARUM 17, 381 (1982); BRUCE W. BUGBEE, 
GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); LUCA MOLÀ, THE SILK INDUSTRY OF 
RENAISSANCE VENICE 188 (2000); John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002); Maximilian Frumkin, Early History of Patents for Invention, 26 
TRANSACTIONS NEWCOMEN SOC’Y 47 (1947); M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 143 (1945); Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24; Frank D. 
Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944); Craig 
A. Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & 
ECON 223 (2006); Frank D. Prager, Examination of the Inventions from the Middle Ages to 1836, 46 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 268 (1964); Frank D. Prager, Standards of Patentable Inventions from 1474 to 1952, 
20 U. CHI. L. REV. (1952). 
 29 In his investigation at the Venice State Archive, Mandich discovered five statutory patents, 
issued in full compliance with the statute, which he considered to be atypical application of the 1474 
Act. He discusses the five privileges at page 136 and, in particular, in footnote 74 of Primi 
Riconoscimenti. Mandich, Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziana di un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, 
supra note 24, at 136 n.74. They are: Faustino Bergnano, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, 
registro 1, carta 3 recto and verso (issued on Mar. 14, 1592); Paris di Nolli and Marc’Aurelio Gaburro, 
ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, registro 1, carta 5 recto (issued on July 10, 1592); 
Piero Caracello, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, registro 1, carta 90 recto (issued on 
Dec. 16, 1593); Piero Bordin , ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, registro 1, carta 109 
recto (issued on Apr. 18, 1594); Zuanne Tramontano, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, 
registro 1, carta 185 verso (issued on July 10, 1595). See id. Moreover, in his previous work, Le 
Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), Mandich seems to acknowledge the existence of statutory 
patents by saying that “based on the 1474 Act, patents should have been issued by the Provveditori di 
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1474 Act was a first abortive attempt to create a statutory patent system.30 
He argued that when the 1474 Act was implemented, interested subjects 
forgot about its existence and simply continued to adhere to the previous 
practice of privileges issued by the Senate.31 
Nevertheless, in 1974, an Italian law professor, Luigi Sordelli, from 
the University of Siena questioned the validity of these explanations and 
suggested that following the enactment of the 1474 Act in Venice, it was 
possible to obtain patent protection in two ways: through the statutory 
system newly created by the 1474 Act, and through the much older 
customary system characterized by direct, ad hoc patents issued by the 
Senate.32 In other words, in Sordelli’s opinion, the 1474 Act did not replace 
or formalize the previous practice of senatorial grants.33 On the contrary, he 
convincingly argued that “at that time, even after they enacted the ‘statute,’ 
the Senate (the most important legislative body of the Republic), would not 
deem its power to grant single privileges or special ones with higher or 
different terms than those indicated in the law to be limited [in any way].”34 
Moreover, Sordelli added that insufficient investigation at the Venice State 
Archives rather than to the failure to implement the statute resulted in only 
a few extant patents issued by the Provveditori di Comun in full 
 
Comun, but the Scritture, that are kept at the Venice State Archive and collect few grants issued by the 
Provveditori in conformity to the aforementioned statute, are dated only from 1562.” (translated 
from Italian) (emphasis added). Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 
24, at 523 n.4. In this way, Mandich appears to argue that, because the relative documents are not extant 
anymore (over time the Venice Achieves have been subject to nine or ten fires—the most devastating 
one in 1577—and the Scritture dating before 1562 have been lost), it is impossible to determine if there 
has been any substantial, literal application (not just the issuance of “few grants”) of the 1474 Act 
immediately following its enactment. See id. at 523. For information about the fires that destroyed part 
of the Scritture, see ANDREA DA MOSTO, L’ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA, TOMO V (1937) (It.), 
http://www.archiviodistatovenezia.it/siasve/DaMosto_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L2H-AMB7]. 
 30 REMO FRANCESCHELLI, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE (1960) (It.); 
Remo Franceschelli, La Prima Legge Generale in Materia di Invenzioni Industriali (la “Parte” 
Veneziana 19 Marzo 1474), 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 371, 371-73 (1955) (It.). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 380 (“Therefore, this allows . . . to see the 
coexistence of industrial privileges granted by the Senate and privileges granted by the Provveditori di 
Comun because of the power given to them by a law . . . issued by the Senate.”)  ( t ranslated from 
Ital ian) .  
 33 Id. at 378. 
 34 Id. at 379 (“[N]el periodo in esame, il Senato (il maggior organo legislative della Repubblica) 
potesse non sentirsi limitato nella sua sovranità anche dopo l’emanazione della “parte,” nel concedere 
privilegi singoli o speciali in termini maggiori o diversi dalla legge”). Moreover, Sordelli noted that “in 
the XVI century and, generally, around that time in Venice . . . it was known the super power of the 
Senate and its tendency to centralize all the functions used to regulate the life of the State in political and 
economic matters . . .” (quoting ENRICO BESTA, IL SENATO VENEZIANO (ORIGINI, COSTITUZIONE, 
ATTRIBUZIONI E RITI) (1899)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. 
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compliance with the specifications of the Act.35 In these respects, it is 
notable that in 2000 Luca Molà, an associate professor and Director of the 
Centre for the History of Innovation and Creativity at the University of 
Warwick, managed to identify fifteen more statutory patents at the Venice 
State Archive.36 More significantly, in recent years, 85 additional patents 
issued by the Provveditori di Comun have been discovered. These 
additional patents are fully examined in a separate paper that I co-authored 
with Ted Sichelman and Toni Veneri, in which we provide conclusive 
evidence that Sordelli’s hypothesis was correct and shed important new 
light on the true origin of patent law.37 
The existence of two parallel systems of patent protection for 
inventions manifests great relevance for the research described in this 
paper, because tailoring patent protection in Venice functioned exclusively 
through Senatorial privileges. Indeed, the conditions for the patents issued 
under the 1474 Act, in particular, in regard to their terms and penalties for 
infringement, were established ad priori and were the same for all the 
inventions. As explained below, the situation in the context of patents 
issued under the customary system was different—the Senate had 
unconditional power to decide the number of years of exclusivity, as well 
as the consequences for violating the patent in each case. In this way, the 
Senate could customize the protection granted and promote certain 
inventions over others. Therefore, this article focuses on the Venetian 
customary system. After a brief historical overview and description of the 
statutory patent system, Part I explains how inventors could obtain 
Senatorial privileges and the relevance of these grants for the protection of 
inventions in different industries. 
A. Brief Historical Background of the Venetian Republic 
The history of Venice begins around the year 697 with the 
organization of the lagoon as an autonomous military outpost and the 
election of its first dux, the Doge, by the local population.38 
 
 35 See Franceschelli, La Prima Legge Generale in Materia di Invenzioni Industriali (la “Parte” 
Veneziana 19 Marzo 1474), supra note 30, at 377. Franceschelli noted that a lot of the records 
collecting documents relevant for the determination of the activity of the Provveditori di Comun during 
the period immediately after the enactment of the 1474 Act are not extant anymore. Consequently, it is 
impossible to determine if the patent statute was applied soon after its adoption or with some delay. See 
also Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24. 
 36 Luca Molà identified fifteen more patents issued directly by the Provveditori di Comun and 
making explicit reference to the 1474 Act. See MOLÀ, supra note 28. 
 37 Ted Sichelman, Stefania Fusco & Toni Veneri, Retracing the Origins of the 
Patent System (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 38 See FREDERIC C. LANE, STORIA DI VENEZIA 8 (1978) (It.) (the term Doge derives from the Latin 
word dux translated as “military leader.” The Doge of Venezia was the chief magistrate and leader of 
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Notwithstanding the independent designation of a leader, at that time 
Venice was under the direct control of the Byzantine Empire.39 The close 
relationship between the lagoon and the Emperor of Constantinople was 
signified by the fact that the Doge received orders from Ravenna, the center 
of the Byzantine power in Italy, for at least the next two centuries.40 
The Byzantine Empire’s influence progressively weakened over time, 
and by the beginning of the 9th century, Venice had acquired de facto 
independence, while nominally remaining Byzantine.41 In the meantime, 
Venice had refused to subject itself to the authority of Charlemagne, who 
became Emperor in 800 and unified most of Western Europe under the 
Carolingian Empire.42 By the year 1000, Venice was completely 
independent and was determined to become what historians have called 
“the freest of all the many Italian free-cities of that time.”43 
After the year 1000, Venice rapidly evolved from a community of 
fishermen, boatmen and small merchants into a maritime nation with 
substantial supremacy on the Adriatic coasts.44 During the 12th century, 
Venice became extremely wealthy through its control of trade between 
Europe and the Levant, and even expanded its dominion beyond the 
Adriatic Sea.45 Because of Venetian success in international trade and the 
ensuing easy access that its merchants had within a growing number of new 
markets, there was a significant increase in the international demand for 
Venetian products, in addition to the sizable domestic demand.46 
Consequently, during the 14th and 15th centuries, the need to expand the 
 
the Republic); see also GINO BINOBENVENUTI, LE REPUBBLICHE MARINARE: AMALFI, PISA, GENOVA E 
VENEZIA (1989) (It.); CHARLES DIEHL, LA REPUBBLICA DI VENEZIA (2007) (It.); 1 SAMUELE 
ROMANIN, STORIA DOCUMENTATA DI VENEZIA (1860) (It.). 
 39 LANE, supra note 38, at 8. 
 40 The great influence of the Byzantine Empire over the Venetian Republic is clearly marked by the 
lagoon’s political institutions and art; Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 In 810 Charlemagne sent his son, Pepin, to conquer Venice and the Byzantine Emperor 
intervened on behalf of Venice with his army to reaffirm his authority over the lagoon. With the Pax 
Nicephori, Charlemagne promised the Byzantine emperor, Nikephoros I, to renounce reducing the 
lagoon of Venice and Dalmatia under his power. DONALD M NICOL, BYZANTIUM AND VENICE: A 
STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS 23 (1988); see also ROBERTO CESSI, 1-2 PACTA 
VENETA, in 4-5 ARCHIVIO VENETO (1928-1929) (It.). While it was also formally stipulated that the 
Venetian territory, called “dogato,” belonged to the Byzantine Empire, Venice remained under the 
leadership of the Doge whose actions did not reflect the Emperor’s orders anymore; LANE, supra note 
38, at 8. 
 43 Venice also avoided being subjected to the authority of the various German tribes that descended 
onto the Italian peninsula after the collapse of the Roman Empire. LANE, supra note 38, at 7. 
 44 Id. 
 45 JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, A HISTORY OF VENICE (1982). 
 46 LANE, supra note 38, at 184. 
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production of local goods to satisfy foreign markets was of primary 
importance, for what at that point had become the Republic of Venice, or 
the Serenissima Repubblica.47 It is in this context that the Venetian 
government began issuing “ad hoc” patents, called privilegi,48 which were 
primarily granted by the Senate through private Acts.49 
The purpose of these privilegi, at least initially, was to lure foreign 
artisans and induce them to bring their knowledge and techniques to 
Venice.50 The idea was to promote innovation and boost the local 
production of goods by introducing new technologies and increasing 
competition. In fact, as Ted Sichelman and Sean O’Connor have previously 
pointed out, these initial “patents were not negative rights to exclude, as 
today, but positive privileges or licenses to practice.”51 In other words, 
these were “pro-competitive patents” designed to break the monopoly of 
the local trade associations of specialist artisans and merchants, the guilds, 
by conferring non-members the possibility of selling products and 
practicing methods of production, which were otherwise forbidden to 
them.52 The next subsection fully explains the reasons for the creation of 
the first system of patent protection in the world.53 
B. The Origin of Patent Protection 
Since the beginning of the 12th century, the activity of artisans and 
merchants had been highly regulated in Venice.54 Specifically, in 1173, the 
Venetian government passed legislation that granted the guilds exclusive 
rights to practice “mechanical trades,” such as glassmaking, shipbuilding 
and silk making.55 Moreover, foreign nationals were generally excluded 
from becoming guild members. In a time of extraordinary economic growth 
 
 47 On April 15, 1423, Francesco Foscari became Doge and acquired the title of Prince, Serenissimo 
Principe. Contextually, the Serenissima Signoria, a supreme government body comprising the Doge, 
six advisers to the Doge called the Minor Consiglio and three leaders of the Quaratia (the supreme 
judicial tribunal), was created by the Maggior Consiglio (a political organ with the power to create laws). 
The Commune of Venice ceased to exist and became the Serenissima Repubblica. FREDERICK C. LANE, 
VENICE: A MARITIME REPUBLIC 112 (1973). 
 48 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 49 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1273-78. 
 50 Id. at 1269. 
 51 Id. (“Unlike today’s patent systems—which solely encompass negative rights to exclude against 
the backdrop of a generally free market—the Venetian patent system provide a dual right, part of which 
allowed the patent holder to compete in an otherwise regulated system dominated by the guilds.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 54 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1273-78. 
 55 RICHARD J. GOY, VENETIAN VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE: TRADITIONAL HOUSING IN THE 
VENETIAN LAGOON 93-94 (1989). 
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and expansion in international trade, such as that in 14th century Venice, 
these regulations must have appeared to be significant limitations on the 
full exploitation of the many opportunities that the Venetian policy of 
independence and colonialism provided.56 However, conflicts emerged at 
that time between Venetian merchants, who had the capital and skills to 
pursue those opportunities and artisans, who wanted to protect their 
markets and traditional ways of production.57 
Ultimately, the Venetian government opted to open the city’s doors to 
innovation and competition.58 Therefore, commencing in the early 13th 
Century, the Grand Council of Venice, the Maggior Consiglio, began 
granting licenses to build various kinds of machines, such as innovative 
mills and water pumps, to individuals who were not members of the related 
guilds.59 The beneficiaries of these licenses were often foreigners with 
skills and technologies unknown in Venice.60 However, it soon became 
obvious that these licenses failed to give adequate protection to inventors 
and skilled artisans.61 That is, they did not provide the possibility of 
precluding others—guild-members, in particular—from copying the new 
trades, methods, and machines that began appearing in Venetian territory.62 
Consequently, inventors likely have complained and petitioned for 
something more than the mere privilege of competing with the guilds. They 
likely have requested the much more significant right to exclude others 
from practicing their inventions.63 The first patent incorporating 
exclusionary rights that we know of was granted by the Maggior Consiglio 
in 1416 to Ser Francisus Petri, perhaps unsurprisingly a foreigner, for a 
device to full wool (that is, a device to turn wool into felt).64 
During the following three centuries until the end of the Republic in 
1796, the Venetian government issued thousands of patents to both 
foreigners and nationals for a wide variety of inventions, including 
watermills, canal-dredging equipment, food-processing machines, soap 
formulations and dyeing methods.65 By the 16th century, Venice had 
 
 56 See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1268-69. 
 57 LANE, supra note 38, at 184. 
 58 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1274, 1278. 
 59 Id. at 1274. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 ASV, Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni, registro 22, carta 7 verso (image file number 15v) 
(issued on Feb. 20, 1415) (the term of this patent was 50 years); see also Mandich, Primi 
Riconoscimenti Veneziana di un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, supra note 24. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See infra Part II; see also Molà, supra note 24. 
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undergone a complete transformation, having become the center of 
technological development in Europe,66 and having changed from a nation 
of sailors into a nation of mainly artisans and engineers.67 The full 
description of the Venetian Republic’s system of patent protection is the 
subject of the next subsection. 
C. The Venetian Patent Systems: Customary Patents and Statutory Patents 
In 1974, Luigi Sordelli explained that between the 15th and 18th 
centuries two systems of patent protection were operating concurrently in 
Venice: one based on customary law, and the other based on the 1474 
Patent Act.68 This part of the article first briefly describes the statutory 
system, and then focuses on the customary system to provide information 
relevant to understanding the mechanisms that the Venetian government 
used to promote certain industries over others. 
1. The Statutory System 
The Venetian statutory patent system was based on a patent act 
enacted by the Senate in 1474. Under the 1474 Act, an inventor who 
wanted to obtain a patent had to submit an application, called supplica, to 
the office of the Provveditori di Comun.69 At that point, the Provveditori di 
Comun reviewed the application and issued a response often stating that 
“they had seen the invention,” and sometimes, that they had made a 
determination about its social utility and novelty.70 Ultimately, if the result 
of the review was positive, a privilegio was granted to the inventor. As 
explained below, the review operated by the Provveditori di Comun for 
statutory patents was much more limited than the one made for customary 
patents, in which multiple agencies that specialized in different subject 
matters were usually involved in the examination process.71 Consequently, 
whereas reviewing the applications for senatorial patents could take several 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 LANE, supra note 38. 
 68 See supra Part I. 
 69 Sordelli noted that a copy of the 1474 Act was included in the “Capitolar Maggiore,” a 
collection of laws and administrative acts from 1272 to 1600 used to define the competences of the 
Provveditori di Commun. See Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 376 and 392. See also 
Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 520. The Provveditori di 
Comun was an executive department instituted in 1256. It was responsible for numerous subject matters 
including: trade, the arts or arti (wool working, silk making, gold working etc.), shipbuilding, 
glassmaking, streets, small channels, bridges, schools, immigration, and the association of doctors and 
surgeons. See ORGANI AMMINISTRATIVI (It.), 
http://www.icar.beniculturali.it/biblio/pdf/damosto_html/05_.html [https://perma.cc/FD68-VU4N]. 
 70 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 394-96. 
 71 See infra note 72. See also supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
17:301 (2020) Lessons from the Past 
315 
months, the one for patents granted by the Provveditori di Commun was 
cursory, and resulted in the issuance of a privilege soon after the 
submission of the supplica.72 
A typical example of a privilegio issued by the Provveditori di Comun 
is reported below: 
We, Advise Manin, Fantin Diego and Zuanne Danodo, for the Illustrious and 
Eminent Ducal Domain of Venice Provveditori di Comun, having seen the 
supplica produced before us this very day by Aleessandro Tornimben and Sir. 
Gierolamo Prevaglio for which they have requested the grant of a privilege for 
ten consecutive years, that no one aside from them or other [person having 
authority from them], in this city or other lands or places in this Illustrious 
Domain, will be allowed to make or have [other people] make in any way the 
cakes . . . with seven kinds of dough and . . . all kinds of meat . . . and fish and 
with the method and dosages found by the applicants . . . as it is possible to 
read in their supplica . . . [S]ince We consider it to be a good thing to favor 
new invention through [the exercise] of our authority and because of the 
March 19, 1474 Act of the Worshipful Senate, we grant freedom and 
privilege to the above mentioned Sir, Alessandro et Girolamo, that for ten 
consecutive years no one aside from those [people having their permission] 
will be able to make for the purpose of selling in these cities, lands and places 
of this Illustrious Domain, the new inventions of cakes and other [things] 
[made] in the way [described] above . . . under the penalty of 100 ducats and 
of losing the things that will be found [at the time the infringement is 
discovered], and of other penalties included in the Act to which all the 
infringers are . . . subject; being however [understood] that the invention is 
new and not being found by others . . . [and that] no other privilege has been 
granted by others, being understood that this privilege cannot have a negative 
impact on those who want to [make the cakes] at home or the host for the 
advantage of their taverns, and, in the same way, being understood that the 
pastry makers will not be limited to doing what they are permitted to do by 
their [guild].73 
 
 72 See infra Part I.C.2. See also Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra 
note 24, at 519 (arguing that, based on the words of the 1474 Act, the effect of the submission of the 
application was the immediate issuance of the patent). 
 73 See ASV, Provveditori di Comun, busta 17, registro 33, carte 62 verso and 63 recto (issued on 
Sept. 19, 1592) at 17 (“Noi Alvise Manin, Fantin Diedo et Zuanne Dandolo per l’Illustrissimo Ducal 
Dominio di Venetia Provveditori de Comun veduta la supplicatione davanti di noi prodotta sotto il 
presente giorno per ser Alessandro Tornimben et missier Gierolamo Prevaglio per la quale ci 
ricercano che gli dobbiamo concederli privilegio per anni dieci continui altri che loro o cui da loro 
haverà causa così in questa città come in altre terre et luochi di questo Illustrissimo Dominio non possi 
far né far fare quovis modo la nova inventione di pastizzi fatti de cinque sorti di paste lavorati con ogni 
sorte de carnami et uzzelami sì di grasso come di magro con pesce et senza fatti in diverse sorti foggie 
et maniere et modi de dosi per loro supplicanti ritrovate et medesimamente sfogliade torte et giudoni et 
offete (?) come nella loro supplicatione si legge alla qual si habbi relatione onde considerada Noi esser 
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As this example illustrates, statutory patents made direct reference to 
the 1474 Act and were issued in full application of the statute.74 
Importantly, they were granted for a term of ten years and provided a 
penalty of 100 ducats in cases of infringement.75 These two elements 
fundamentally differentiate statutory patents from customary patents, 
which did not have a fixed term or penalty.76 Thus, a Venetian statutory 
patent was the result of a straightforward process detailed in the Patent Act 
and characterized by a limited review of the application conducted by the 
issuing authority, the Provveditori di Comun. 
On the other hand, depending on the characteristics of the invention, 
the customary patents could provide more and stronger rights, and were the 
result of a much more extensive examination of the application than the 
patents issued under the 1474 Act. In other words, as discussed in detail in 
the next subsection, customary patents were the tools to obtain tailored, and 
often, stronger patent protection for inventions in the Venetian Republic. 
2. The Customary System 
Between the 15th and 18th centuries, patent protection could also be 
obtained in the Venetian Republic through customary law.77 In this case, 
applicants had the option of submitting an application, or supplica, which 
was addressed to the Doge or, sometimes, the Doge and the Signoria.78 The 
supplica was then transmitted to the Minor Consiglio, which in turn, 
assigned one or more of its departments to the substantive examination of 
the invention based on its subject matter.79 The executive departments that 
were frequently involved in the review of patent applications were80: 
 
cosa giusta a favorir nove inventioni per auttorità del magistrato nostro et virtù della parte 
dell’Eccellentissimo Senato, 1474 19 marzo concedemo libertà et privilegio alli suddetti ser 
Alessandro et Gierolamo che per anni X continuij alcuno sij chi esser si vogli non possi far né far fare 
per vender in questa città né altre città terre et luochi di questo Illustrissimo Dominio le nove inventioni 
di far pastizzi et altro, nel modo come di sopra sì come hanno supplicato sotto pena de ducati cento et 
perdita delle robbe che seranno ritrovate et altre pene contenute nella detta parte, alla qual sottozasi 
tutti li transgressori inremissibilmente essendo però inventione nova non più d’altri ariccordata né ad 
altri statoli concesso privilegio, intendendosi che il presente privelegio non possi far pregiudicio a 
quelli che volessero fare per casa loro alli pasti banchetti né etiam alli osti per commodo delle loro 
hostarie, et così s’intendi alli scalletteri non gli sij pregiudicato di far quel tanto che ad essa arte gli è 
concesso. Datum die xix Septembris 1592.”) (emphasis added). 
 74 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 376 and 392. 
 75 See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra Part II.2. 
 77 See Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16. 
 78 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 520, 523. The 
Serenissima Signoria was the supreme government body of the Venetian Republic and comprised the 
Doge, the Minor Consiglio and three leaders of the Quaratia. See LANE, supra note 38. 
 79 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 523 (noting that the 
reason for the involvement of different magistrates could be to guarantee the inventor’s rights by 
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 Provveditori di Comun, for all kinds of inventions;81 
 Savi ed Essecuatori alle Acque, for inventions related to water; 
 Sopraprovveditori e Provveditori alle Biave, for inventions related to 
agriculture, food-processing machines and ovens; 
 Cinque Savii alla Mercantia, for inventions related to trade; 
 Provveditori Sopra la Seta, for inventions related to silk working; 
 Provveditori alla Sanità, for health-related invention. 
In the case of Sebastano di Silvestri, who in 1560 submitted a supplica 
for a “new method to provide energy to certain draining water machines,”82 
the Minor Consiglio assigned its prosecution to the Provveditori di Comun 
and the Savi ed Essecuatori alle Acque. Typically, the notation of the 
assignment, comprising a preset formula, was added by the secretary of the 
Minor Consiglio under the text of the original application. In Silvestri’s 
case it states: 
The Savi ed Essecuatori alle Acque and the Proveditor di Comun will answer 
this supplica and, having seen the [invention], will declare and sign their 
opinion under oath and according to the laws.83 
In the supplica, the inventor would generally provide her name, her 
origin, a description of the invention, and an assertion that the invention 
was new, ingenious and useful.84 Further, a statement referring to the 
significant cost and the amount of work necessary to produce the invention 
was often present.85 The inventor would also expressly request granting the 
 
protecting her from the arbitrary judgement of a single deciding body); see also infra Part II. The Minor 
Consiglio was a constitutional body of the Republic and comprised six advisors to the Doge, who 
administered his affairs. See LANE, supra note 38. 
 80 See generally, Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 523; 
Molà, supra note 24. 
 81 For most applications, regardless of subject matter, the examination was performed by 
Provveditori di Comun often together with one or two other executive departments of the Minor 
Consiglio. See Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 523. 
 82 Sebastano di Silvestri, ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 43, carta 20v (image file 
number 81) (issued on Nov. 2, 1560). 
 83 Id. (“Respondeant huic supplicatione Domini Sapientes et Executores super Acquis, necnon 
Domini Proveditores Communis, et visis videndis dicant eorum opinionem cum iuramento et 
subscriptione manuum suarum iuxta leges.”). 
 84 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 521 (“[T]he 
applications were from citizens of Venice, subjects of the Domain, foreigners [coming] from the 
peninsula, artisans, merchants, nobles and, in 1508, for the first time, also from a Jew. [A considerable 
number of petitioners] were companies . . . It is also [necessary] to remember that a lot of petitioners 
remained anonymous until they received the grant.”) (translated from Italian). 
 85 Id. at 522. 
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privilegio—its attendant exclusive rights with geographic coverage and a 
term of protection.86 Finally, in the majority of the cases, she would ask for 
a penalty in case of infringement of the patent.87 Sebastano di Silvestri’s 
application again represents a useful example. It states: 
I, Sebastian di Silvestri Domino, son of the excellent Sr. Marin, having found 
an easy, fast, very effective and inexpensive method of providing energy to 
[certain draining water machines] . . . humbly petition Your Grace to grant a 
privilege to me that nobody in this Illustrious Domain would be able to use 
similar methods without a license or an authorization from me or my heirs or 
other person having authority from me, for a term of 50 years. Under penalty 
of 25 ducats and of losing the instrument or machine that [the infringer] 
had built.88 
Once the examination was complete, the various executive 
departments involved in the review process recorded their recommendation 
to grant or reject the privilege in their official records and sent it to the 
Minor Consiglio.89 In some cases, they also expressed an opinion regarding 
the requested term. Thus, in Silvestri’s case, the Savi ed Essecuatori alle 
Acque wrote: 
[W]e humbly answer that our opinion is that [Your Grace] should grant the 
privilege, with the condition, however, that [the invention] will not create an 
obstacle to the flow of the water . . . and that the requested term of 50 years 
appears too high, that 25 years should be enough.90 
At that point, assuming a positive result of the substantive 
examination, the application moved forward and was presented by 
individual councilors of the Minor Consiglio to the Senate for vote.91 If 
 
 86 See also infra Part II. 
 87 See also infra Part II. 
 88 Silvestri, supra note 82 (“Impero` havendo io Sebastian di Silvestri Domino figliol 
dell’eccellente missier Marin, ritrovato un modo di dar un moto facile veloce e di gran forza et poca 
spesa, a [edifici da scolar acqua] . . . supplico riverentemente Vostra Serenita` che mi voglia 
conciedere grazia, che nuino sotto questo Illustrissimo Dominio adoperar simil sorte di moto senza 
licentia et voluntà mia et de mei heredi o cui heverà causa da me per spacio de anni 50. Sotto la pena 
di ducati 25 et di perder lo instrumento over edificio che evesse fatto . . . .”). 
 89 See Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 524-25. 
 90 Silvestri, supra note 82 (“[R]iveramente rispondemo nostro parer esser che per Vostra Sublimità 
li sia concessa la grazia, con condizione però che non se impedisca il corso delle acque . . . ne pare che 
il tempo che’l richiede de 50 anni sia troppo, ch eli possa bastar havendo de anni 25 . . . .” 
)(demonstrating negotiations resulting in limited term of protection). 
 91 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 524-25, (noting that 
“the patent granted by the Senate—called “privilegio” or “gratia”—is, generally, [issued] in 
conformity, [perhaps] with some modification, with the supplica . . . . Indeed one of the formulas often 
used for the grant says: ‘we grant what the aforementioned petitioner has requested’ (‘quod 
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approved, a brief summary of the grant was recorded in the official register 
of the Senate, called registri.92 In Silvestri’s case, the Senate, 
notwithstanding the fact that the very influential Provveditori di Comun, 
also assigned to the case, had approved the requested 50 years, ultimately 
decided to follow the recommendation of the Savi ed Essecuatori alle 
Acque and granted a privilegio with a 25-year term. The grant states: 
Under the authority of this Council it is granted to Domino Sebastaino di 
Silvestri that for 25 years no one aside from him or other person having 
authority from him, in this city or other city or place in our Domain, can use 
the new, easy, fast, inexpensive and very effective method that he has found to 
provide energy to various machines invented by engineers to drain and absorb 
water under the penalty included in his supplica,93 
As the Silvestri case illustrates, contrary to the Venetian statutory 
patents, the Venetian customary patents did not have a fixed term and 
penalty. Based on the original documents examined at the Venice State 
Archive for this research, customary patents could be granted for 10, 20, 
25, 30, 40, 50 or 60 years.94 They could also be granted “for life,” or in 
perpetuity.95 Similarly, there was significant variation in the assigned 
penalties, which could range from two ducats per infringing item to a flat 
1,000 ducat fine.96 The Senate possessed the ultimate authority to decide 
both the term and the penalty in each case.97 Specifically, the Senate had 
the power to decide whether to grant the term requested by the inventor in 
her supplica or to reject it and grant a different one, typically, a shorter 
term.98 
The Senate’s ability to decide the term is a key element in my research 
because it illustrates the fact that the Venetian government had the power 
to control the level of incentives provided to different industries. The same 
argument could be made in the case of the assignment of the penalty, but, 
 
suprascripto supplicani concedatur sictu petit’), in this way causing the content of the supplica to be 
incorporated in the patent”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Silvestri, supra note 82 (“Che per autorita` di questo Consiglio sia concesso a Domino 
Sebastiano di Silvestri che per 25 anni alcun altro che esso, ochi avera` causa da lui non possa in questa 
città, nè in alcun’altra città o luogo del Dominio nostro senza permission sua usar il modo ritrovato 
novamente da lui di dar un moto facile, veloce, di poca spesa, et di gran forza alli edificij, che sono stà 
ritrovati da diversi ingegneri per scollar, et scigar acque, et si come nella sua supplicatione sotto le 
pene contenute in essa . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 94 See infra Part II. 
 95 See infra Part II. 
 96 See infra Part II. 
 97 See infra Part II; see also Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 
24, at 525. 
 98 See infra Part II. 
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as explained in the next section, this aspect of the customary system seems 
to have served a different function. Specifically, it appears to have been 
related to both the costs of policing possible infringements and the 
execution of what could be considered to be an injunction to destroy the 
infringing copy or copies of the invention, rather than the need to induce 
inventors to produce new knowledge. Consequently, the Senate’s 
determination of the terms and penalties of the customary patents will be 
the subject of a full analysis in the next section. 
II. TAILORED PATENT PROTECTION IN THE VENETIAN 
REPUBLIC 
The Venetian Senate issued a few thousand customary patents 
between the 15th and the 18th centuries.99 As discussed in the previous 
section, customary patents did not have a fixed term of protection and 
penalty.100 The term was generally the subject of a request by the applicant 
in her supplica. However, in more than 60% of the cases, the Senate 
rejected the requested term and granted a different one.101 Similarly, the 
penalty was decided by the Senate with or without deference to what the 
applicant had asked in her application. For example, on March 22, 1567, 
Giacomo Bellasio and his brothers requested a patent for a new mill that 
made “all the [loom’s] spindles to spin equally, so that without a lot of 
effort and inconvenience the silk result[ed] evenly woven and stronger . . . 
and more beautiful than when other mills [were used].”102 The applicants 
requested a term of 20 years and a penalty of 500 ducats, but the Senate 
granted only 15 years and 300 ducats.103 How did the Senate decide on the 
term and penalty for this and other inventions protected through the 
customary system? This part of the article focuses on this question and 
demonstrates that the Venetian government used its power to decide the 
patent’s terms as a tool to incentivize certain industries more than others. 
A. The Investigation at the State Archives in Venice 
In order to understand how the Venetian Senate determined the term 
and penalty of customary patents, I conducted a thorough analysis of the 
original documents available at the Venice State Archive. Specifically, I 
 
 99 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24. 
 100 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 101 See infra Part II.B. 
 102 ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 5, registro 1 (“[T]utti essi fusi girano egualmente, 
in modo che senza tanta fatica, et fastidio le sederiescano ugualmente filade, e forte . . . et piu’ belle che 
alli altri molini non fanno . . . .”). 
 103 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 46, carta 121 recto (image file number 290). 
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decided to identify and study all of the customary patents issued by the 
Senate between 1560 and 1580. 
The decision to focus on this period was driven, in part, by the fact 
that the records of the various authorities involved in the prosecution of the 
customary patents are often incomplete and do not entirely encompass the 
approximately 350 years of the system’s operation.104 For example, the 
extant Senate’s registri are available for almost the full period of the 
Venetian patent system’s existence. However, the extant scritture of the 
Provveditori di Comun that were not lost or destroyed, only extend about 
twenty years: 1562-1566; 1567-1570; 1570-1577; 1591-1596.105 
Consequently, not all of the periods can be analyzed in detail. 
On the other hand, the years between 1560 and 1580 appear to be 
particularly appropriate for the purpose of providing a full understanding of 
the customary patent system. In fact, by the end of the 16th century, this 
system had reached its maturity.106 At the same time, the economy of the 
Serenissima had completed its transformation and had turned into a 
production economy.107 In addition, Venice had established itself as one of 
the super powers of that time.108 Therefore, by the end of the 16th century, 
the Venetian customary system operated in a strong economic and political 
environment that had the benefit of almost 150 years of experience, and 
had remained unaffected by the uncertainties and complications that 
characterized the Republic’s subsequent period of decline. Ultimately, it 
could be said, that by concentrating on the 20 years between 1560 and 
1580, it is possible to observe the system at the height of its sophistication, 
operating in a context of relative stability.109 
The identification of the patents issued by the Senate during the 
selected period required the meticulous and lengthy investigation of the 
relevant authorities’ records. In particular, the analysis of the Senate’s 
registri, in which all of the decisions issued by this authority were 
recorded, revealed the patents granted between 1560 and 1580. The list of 
 
 104 Copies of these records’ indexes for the periods covered by each extant volume are on file with 
the author. 
 105 Id. The main reason for missing records is fires, in particular the 1577 fire that devastated the 
Doge’s palace. See 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS RELATING TO ENGLISH AFFAIRS 
xxiv-xxv (ed. Rawdon Lubbock Brown, 1864). 
 106 Consider that by the end of the 16th century, patents were considered to be a commodity like 
any other, which could be transferred, inherited and used for a dowry. Companies were formed to 
acquire patents and trade on them as opposed to using them to develop related products. See Molà, supra 
note 24. 
 107 See supra Part I.B. 
 108 LANE, supra note 38. 
 109 See Molà, supra note 24. 
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the identified patents with the relative issuance dates was then used to 
select the Senate’s files, the filze, in which the documentation of the 
prosecution of the patents—a copy of the patent application with the 
response of the Minor Consiglio, a copy of the executive departments’ 
opinions involved in the review process, and the final grant by the Senate—
was recorded. The Provveditori di Comun’s records, the scritture and atti, 
in which copies of the patent applications and the result of this 
department’s investigations were filed, helped to fill possible gaps in the 
filze’s documentation. Finally, the review of the Collegio’s registry, the 
Risposte di Dentro,110 in which the original patent applications were kept, 
allowed completing the collection of the necessary data for this 
investigation. In the end, a total of twelve Senate’s registri,111 twenty-nine 
Senate’s filze,112 four Provveditori di Comun’s registries113—one scritture 
and three atti, and three Collegio’s Risposte di Dentro114 were scrupulously 
reviewed and analyzed. The investigation ultimately produced a list of 155 
customary patents granted by the Senate during the relevant period with a 
variety of terms of protection and penalties. The details of the identified 
patents are the subject of a full discussion in the next subsection. 
 
 110 The Collegio had two registries: the Risposte di Dentro, “Answers from the Inside,” for 
supplications coming from and/or concerning Venice; and the Risposte di Fuori, “Answers from the 
Outside,” for supplications coming from and/or concerning the rest of the Republic’s domain. Patent 
applications filed with the Minor Consiglio i.e. suppliche for a customary patent were kept in the 
Risposte di Dentro. 
 111 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registri: 42 (Mar. 6, 1559-Aug., 29 1560); 43 (Sept. 7, 
1560-Feb. 28, 1561 m.v.); 44 (Mar. 7, 1562-Feb. 25, 1563 m.v.); 45 (Mar. 2, 1564-Feb. 23, 1565 m.v.); 
46 (Mar. 1, 1566-Feb. 28, 1567 m.v.); 47 (Mar. 4, 1568-Feb. 20, 1569 m.v.); 48 (Mar. 2, 1570-Feb. 25, 
1571 m.v.); 49 (Mar. 1, 1572-Feb. 24, 1573 m.v.); 50 (Mar. 6, 1574-Aug. 29, 1575 m.v.); 51 (Sept. 3, 
1575-Aug. 30, 1577); 52 (Sept. 5, 1577-Feb. 20, 1579 m.v.); 53 (Mar. 1, 1580- Feb. 24, 1581 m.v.). 
 112 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, filze: 31 (Mar. 1560-Aug. 1560); 32 (Sept. 1560-Feb. 1560 
m.v.); 33 (Mar. 1561-June 1561); 34 (July 1561-Oct. 1561); 35 (Nov. 1561-Feb. 1561 m.v.); 38 (Mar. 
1563-Aug. 1563); 39 (Sept. 1563-Feb. 1563 m.v.); 40 (Mar. 1564-Aug. 1564); 41 (Sept. 1564-Nov. 
1564); 48 (Nov. 20, 1566-Feb. 1566 m.v.); 49 (Mar. 1567-Aug. 1567); 52 (Sept. 1568-Feb. 1568 m.v.); 
54 (Sept. 1569-Feb. 1569 m.v.); 57 (March 1571-Aug. 1571); 59 (Mar. 1572-Aug. 1572); 60 (Sept. 
1572-Feb. 1572 m.v.); 63 (Mar. 1574-Aug. 1574); 67 (July 1575-Oct. 1575); 68 (Nov. 1575-Feb. 1575 
m.v.); 71 (Mar. 1577-Aug. 1577); 73 (Mar. 1578-May 1578); 74 (June 1578-Aug. 1578); 75 (Sept. 
1578- Nov. 1578); 76 (Dec. 1578-Feb. 1578 m.v.); 77 (Mar. 1579-June 1579); 78 (July 1579-Oct. 
1579); 79 (Nov. 1579-Feb. 1579 m.v.); 80 (Mar. 1580-Aug. 1580); 81 (Sept. 1580-Feb. 1580 m.v.). 
 113 ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 5: registro 7 (Oct. 1562-Nov. 1566; registro 8: 
Mar. 1567-Dec. 1570; registro 9: Nov. 1570-Oct. 1577); ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Atti, busta 13 
(registro 31: June 1558-Jan. 1559 m.v.); busta 14 (registro 32: Apr. 1560-Oct. 1561; registro 33: Mar. 1565-
May 1567); busta 15 (registro 34: July 1571-Aug. 1574). 
 114 ASV, Collegio, Risposte di Dentro, buste: 2 (1566-1567 m.v.); 3 (1568-1569 m.v.); 4 
(1570-1571 m.v.). 
17:301 (2020) Lessons from the Past 
323 
B. The Senate’s Tools—Terms and Penalties 
The Venetian Senate had significant power to control the level of 
incentives provided to inventors. In fact, as previously mentioned,115 the 
Senate had the authority, at the time of the grant, to decide both the term of 
protection as well as the penalty in case of infringement for each 
invention.116 Specifically, this investigation revealed that during the twenty 
years between 1560 and 1580, the Senate issued a total of 155 customary 
patents and decided to grant terms equal to ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five, 
thirty, forty, fifty and sixty years. Moreover, in four cases, the Senate 
granted a term for “life” or “life plus the life of the heirs.” Finally, one 
patent was issued without a term.117 
Below, Chart 1, Distribution of Terms, illustrates the term distribution 
in detail. Specifically, it reveals that during the relevant period, the most 
frequently granted terms by the Senate were twenty, twenty-five and thirty 
years, which corresponded to 31%, 33% and 20% of the patents, 
respectively. Both ten and fifteen year terms each represented 4% of the 
patents. The remaining 6% of the patents had terms equal to forty, fifty and 
sixty years. Finally, the average number of years of protection was 25.42 
years.118  
 
 115 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 116 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 117 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 45 (issued on Feb. 3, 1565). Presumably, the patent 
in this case had a perpetual term. However, for the purpose of the statistical analysis on the patent terms 
discussed below, this patent was excluded from the dataset. To be sure, I ran the described calculation, 
assigning terms of ten, sixty and eighty years to Piccolomini’s patent and the statistical results 
highlighted in the paper did not change. See Appendix. 
 118 To calculate the average number of years protection and conduct the statistical analysis 
described below, the following number of years have been assigned to patents that did not have a 
numerical term: one patent with a term for “life” received sixty years; three patents with the term of 
“life plus the life of the heirs” received eighty years. I determined the number of years to assign to these 
patents considering that the highest numerical term granted by the Senate between 1560 and 1580 was 
sixty years and that, presumably, the Senate with the term “life” wanted to grant a period of exclusivity 
at least equal to that. Then, I assumed that “life plus the life of the heirs” term must have meant at least 
addition twenty years over the “life” term. Alternatively, I considered the life expectancy of inventors in 
the sixteenth century. Numerous studies discuss the average life expectancy in Europe during the 
Renaissance. They produce different results ranging from thirty-five years to seventy-five years on 
average depending on factors such as sex, wealth, social status, specific geographic area, and children 
mortality (whether the average life expectancy was measured at birth, at age five, at age fifteen or later). 
For this research, I assumed that in the 1500s the average life expectancy of inventors to be between sixty 
and seventy years—considering that almost all the inventors were males and that in this case the life 
expectancy must be measured at fifteen years or later. However, since an inventor could receive a patent 
at almost any age, it becomes very difficult to estimate a “life” or a “life plus the life of the heirs” term. 
Thus, I concluded that the previous analysis was preferable. For studies on life expectancy at different 
points in history, see e.g., J P Griffin, Changing Life Expectancy Throughout History, 101 J. ROYAL 
SOC’Y MED 577 (2008); Robert Finlay, The Venetian Republic as a Gerontocracy: Age and Politics in 
the Renaissance, 8 J. MEDIEVAL & RENAISSANCE STUD. 157 (1978); Gilbert Creighton, When Did a 
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CHART 1: DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS 
 
It is noteworthy that of the 155 identified patents, fifty-two had a term 
equal to the one requested by the applicant in his supplica; one had a longer 
term than the one requested; and eighty-nine had shorter terms. No 
information about the requested term was found for three patents, and in 
ten cases, the applicant did not request a term of protection. Thus, it is 
possible to say with confidence that the Senate granted a term different 
than that requested by the inventor in 58% of the cases. 
Consequently, the situation was clearly more complex in the context 
of the assignment of the penalty. The analysis of the 155 identified patents 
revealed that the Senate adopted a wide range of penalty levels. In 96% of 
the cases, the penalty was a flat fee, but in six cases, the Senate assigned a 
penalty based on the number of unauthorized copies of the invention found 
at the time that the infringement was detected.119 Table 1 below reports the 




Man in the Renaissance Grow Old?, 14 STUD. RENAISSANCE 7 (1967); S. Ryan Johansson, Medics, 
Monarchs and Mortality, 1600-1800: Origins of the Knowledge-Driven Health Transition in Europe 
(University of Oxford, Discussion Papers in Econ. & Soc. Hist., Paper No. 85, Oct. 2010), 
https://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/Paper85/johansson85.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZH6-JZ3C]. 
 119 For the purpose of the statistical analysis on the patent penalties described below, these patents 
have been excluded from the dataset. 
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The distribution of the “flat fee” penalties is reported in Chart 2, 
Distribution of Penalties, which reveals that the three penalties the Senate 
used most frequently were 300 ducats, 500 ducats, and 200 ducats, 
assigned in 28%, 22%, and 19% of cases, respectively. Together, these 
three penalty levels comprise 69% of the identified cases. The next most 
frequent penalty was 100 ducats assigned in 12% of the cases; whereas, the 
Senate assigned 1,000 ducats in three patents—the highest penalty 
reported. Six patents were issued without penalty.120 Finally, in a few cases, 
the Senate also used ten ducats, twenty-five ducats, fifty ducats, 150 ducats, 
200 ducats and 600 ducats. 
  
 
 120 These patents were excluded from the dataset used for the statistical analysis of the patent 
penalties. 
TABLE 1. PATENTS WITH “PER ITEM” PENALTIES 
Invention Penalty 
Jar 2 ducats per jar 
Method to sow wheat 5 ducats per field 
Method to work the fields 10 ducats per field 
Mirror 25 ducats per mirror 
Tools to grind (mill) 50 ducats per mill 
Machine to grind (mill) 1,000 ducats per mill 
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CHART 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PENALTIES 
 
It is also interesting to consider the level of deference that the Senate 
paid to the applicant’s request in the context of the penalties. In this regard, 
an important finding is that the applicants appeared to have a significantly 
lower interest in the assignment of the penalty than they did with the term. 
In fact, in fifty out of 155 cases, the applicant did not even request a 
specific penalty. On the other hand, the applicant failed to request a 
specific term in only fourteen cases. As will be fully discussed in the next 
subsection, a possible explanation for this result is that the function of the 
penalty was primarily to cover the costs of policing infringements and 
enforcing the patent.121 Moreover, the penalty collected in the case of 
infringement had to be divided in equal amounts among three, sometimes 
four different subjects, including the officer who carried out the destruction 
of the unauthorized copy or copies of the invention, as well as the person 
reporting the infringement.122 Consequently, compared to the term, the 
 
 121 See infra Part II.C. 
 122 See infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text. 
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penalty must have appeared to be a much more indirect benefit for the 
inventor who, in one-third of the cases, completely neglected to ask for it.123 
In six cases, no information was found regarding the requested penalty. Of 
the remaining ninety-nine patents, 37% had a penalty other than the one 
requested by the applicant. Specifically, the Senate increased the penalty in 
11% of the cases and reduced it in 26% of the cases. The remaining issue at 
this point is to determine what the Senate wanted to achieve by exercising 
its power to grant the term and penalty in patent law, which will be 
discussed in detail in the next subsection. 
C. Industry-based Patent Protection 
In this part of the article, I explain that the Senate used the granting of 
the term and the penalty to achieve somewhat different goals. The term was 
clearly used to promote certain industries over others, whereas the penalty 
was primarily designed to cover the costs engendered by the infringement 
of the patent. I reached this conclusion by dividing the 155 identified 
patents by the relevant industries of their inventions. The relevant 
industries are: Agriculture, Construction, Energy, Food, Chemistry, Textile 
and Water.124 Because twenty-two of the identified patents could not be 
assigned to any of the aforementioned industries, I created an additional 
category called “Other.” The patents included in the “Other” category 
belong to the following industries: Entertainment, Musical Instruments, 
Home Supply, and other Manufacturing.125 
 
 123 See infra Part II.C. 
 124 The Agriculture industry includes all the identified patents for inventions that pertained to 
agriculture, such as a new method to make the fields fertile or a new machine to irrigate the fields. The 
Construction industry includes all the identified patents for inventions that pertained to building, such as a 
new machine to transport dirt and sand or a new instrument to heat limestone. The Energy industry 
includes all the identified patents for inventions that pertained to the production of energy, such as a new 
and more efficient mill or a new machine to grind (mill) without water. The Food industry includes all 
the identified patents for inventions that pertained to food or food production, such as a new machine to sift 
flour or a new machine to grind meat. The Chemistry industry includes all the identified patents for 
inventions that pertained to chemicals (paintings, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, etc.), such as a new 
pesticide for worms or a new facial oil. The Textile industry includes all the identified patents for 
inventions related to textile production, such as a new method to print fabric with gold and silver and a 
new frame to make silk. The Water industry includes all the identified patents for inventions pertaining 
to management of water, the building of channels or the recovery of swamps, such as new machines or 
methods to dig channels or a new pump to extract water from the soil. 
 125 For each of these latter industries, the number of assigned patents ranges from one to three. 
Examples of the relevant inventions include: bedding for animals (other Manufacturing); a machine in 
which people can see ninety-eight moving arts (Entertainment); and a harpsichord (Musical 
Instruments). 
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The main challenge I encountered in classifying the patents was that 
in two cases, the grant was for multiple inventions, which could have been 
assigned to different industries. Therefore, to avoid double counting, I 
classified these two cases based on the industry of the invention in each 
patent that had the highest economic value. The following, Chart 3, 
Distribution of Patents by Industry, illustrates the distribution of the 
identified patents by industry. It reveals that the two industries with the 
highest number of patents were Water and Energy, 27% and 25%, 
respectively; followed by Textile, 12%; the industries included in “Other,” 
11% total; and Construction, 10%. The industries with the smallest number 
of patents were Food, 6%; Agriculture, 5%; and Chemistry, also 4%. 
CHART 3: DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS BY INDUSTRY 
 
The next step encompassed calculating the average number of years of 
protection granted to inventions in different industries. Table 2 below 
reveals that inventions in the Water and Energy industry received, on 
average, five to seven additional years of protection compared to inventions 
in other industries. 
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The fact that inventions in the Water or Energy industries were 
favored compared to other inventions is also evident when interpreting the 
data in the Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 displays inventions that received the 
longest terms in the twenty years considered. They are all inventions in the 
Water and Energy industries. 
 
In contrast, Table 4 lists the inventions that received the shortest terms 
during the twenty years considered. In this case, only two inventions 
belong to the Energy industry, and there are no inventions from the Water 
industry. 
  











TABLE 3. INVENTIONS WITH THE LONGEST TERMS 1560-1580 
Invention Industry Term 
Machine to lift water Water 40 years 
Methods to build wells Water 50 years + citiz. 
Inventions to dig channels Water 50 years 
Dry mills Energy 50 years 
Machine to grind (mill) Energy 60 years 
Machine to lift water Water Life 
Perpetual motion of water Energy Life + heirs 
Machine to dig channels Water Life + heirs 
Machine to grind (mill) without water Energy Life + heirs 
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To determine if the Venetian Senate also used its power to assign a 
penalty in order to promote certain industries over others, I calculated the 
average penalty by industry. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
Contrary to the term averages, the penalty averages present no statistically 
significant industry-based differences. In fact, if we compare the term 
industry averages with each other, it is possible to identify two distinct 
groups: the Energy-Water group that received longer terms on the one 
hand, and all the other industries on the other. Specifically, when either the 
Energy or Water industry is compared with one of the other industries, the 
difference of the term averages proves to be statistically significant with a 
90% level of confidence.126 However, this result cannot be observed when 
the other industries are compared. Similarly, this result cannot be observed 
when the same statistical analysis is conducted with the penalty averages, 
indicating that there is no relationship between the assignment of a specific 
penalty and the industry of the invention. 
  
 
 126 For a full explanation of statistical analysis conducted here, see Appendix. 
TABLE 4. INVENTIONS WITH THE SHORTEST TERMS 1560-1580 
Invention Industry Years 
Bedding (for animals) Other 10 
Powder for worms Chemistry 10 
Grinder Food 10 
Method to print fabric with gold and 
silver 
Textile 10 
Machine in which people can see 98 
moving arts 
Other 10 
Windmills Energy 10 
Windows Construction 10 
Machine to lift heavy weights Construction 15 
Machine to grind rocks Construction 15 
Mills for silk Energy 15 
17:301 (2020) Lessons from the Past 
331 
 
Finally, with respect to the grant of the term, I compared the 
inventions with the highest assigned penalty to those with the lowest 
penalty, but also in this case, no industry-based differences could be 
identified. However, reading the identified patents helped to glean a 
possible explanation for these penalty results. In fact, as mentioned briefly 
above, the assigned penalty generally had to be divided in equal measure 
among three, or sometimes four, different subjects. These subjects usually 
were: the Pietà (a convent, orphanage, and music school in Venice); the 
Arsenal, the accuser whose identity in many cases had to remain secret; the 
applicant; and the magistrate in charge of executing the injunction to 
destroy or confiscate the infringing copy of the invention.127 Illustrating this 
point, in the case of Auger della Borda and Valentin Correr tedeschi128 the 
Senate decided that: 
[N]obody, aside from them, or those having a license or permission from 
them, for 25 years, can use in any way . . . the new invention . . . under penalty 
of losing the machines and of having to pay 1,000 ducats to be divided in 
four shares, one for the Pietà, one for the Arsenal, one for the accuser, 
[whose identity] must be kept secret, and one for the applicants or those 
who will have authority from them.129 
 
 127 In some cases, the grant included an injunction to either destroy or confiscate the infringing 
copy of the invention. 
 128 Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 43, carte 29 verso and 30 recto (files 99-100) (issued on 
Dec. 11, 1560). 
 129 Id. (“[C]he niuno altro, che essi, ovvero chi haverà licentia, et libertà da loro possi per anni 25 
usar quavis modo . . . il novo ingegno . . . sotto pena di perder gli edificij, et di pagar ducati 1,000 da 
esser divisi in quattro parti una alla Pietà, una all’Arsenal, una all’accusator, il quale sia tenuto segreto, 
et l’altraa loro supplicant o chi haverà causa da essi.”) (emphasis added). 
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The case of Don Joao de Spinosa130 provides another useful example. Here, 
the Senate provided that: 
[F]or 25 years, nobody aside from [the applicant] or those having authority or 
license from him can . . . use in any way [the invention] . . . under penalty of 
losing the machine or machines, made by the infringer, that [at that point] will 
belong to the applicant or those having authority from him and of having to 
pay 400 ducats of which [100 ducats] will go to the accuser, [whose 
identity] will remain secret, 100 [ducats] to the magistrate executing the 
[the injunction], 100 [ducats] . . . to the Arsenal and 100 [ducats] to the 
applicant.131 
Finally, the case of Gerolamo Bembo132 represents an example of 
when the penalty had to be divided among three subjects. Specifically, the 
Senate’s grant said that: 
[N]obody aside from the [applicant], or his heirs, or those having authority 
from him . . . for the period of 30 years can make . . . the machine and 
invention . . . under penalty of losing the machines, models and factories built 
against this order, that will be immediately destroyed, and of paying 500 
ducats one third belonging to the accuser, one third to the magistrate . . . 
executing [this order and] one third to our Arsenal133 
It is notable that in Bembo’s case, the Senate did not even assign a 
portion of the penalty to the applicant. However, this must be considered to 
have been a very unusual situation. Certainly, the function of the penalty 
was also to compensate the patent holder, but this was not the primary 
objective. Indeed, in the context of the penalty, the Senate had to ensure 
that the amount granted, presumably based on the characteristics of the 
specific invention,134 was sufficient not only to satisfy the inventors 
themselves, but also to satisfy all the subjects involved in the infringement, 
 
 130 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 43, carte 125 verso (files 291) (issued on Nov 25, 
1561). 
 131 Id. (“[C]he per anni 25 alcun’altro che esso, o chi haverà causa, ovvero licentia da lui possa . . . 
usar quovimodo l’ingegno . . . sotto pena . . . di perdere . . .l’edificio, ovvero edificij, che avessero fatti, 
gli quali siano d’esso supplicante o de chi haverà causa da lui et di pagar ducati 400 de quali siano 
dell’accustor, il quale sarà tenuto segreto, 100 del magistrate che farà l’esecuzione, cento applicati alla 
casa dell’Arsenal, et 100 di esso supplicante, o de chi haverà causa da lui.”)(emphasis added). 
 132 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 52, carte 179 recto (issued on June 6, 1579). 
 133 Id.(“[C]he altri che lui, o suoi heredi, o chi haverà causa da lui, non possa per lo spazio d’anni 
30 prossimi fabicar . . . l’edificio et invention . . . sotto pena di perder li edificij, modelli, et fabriche 
fatte contra il presente ordine, qulai siano subito rovinate, et di ducati 500 un terzo de quali sia 
dell’accusator, un terzo di quell magistrato. . . che farà l’esecuzione, et l’atro terzo alla casa nostra 
dell’ Arsenale.”)(emphasis added). 
 134 In this case, I am speculating regarding the possibility that the penalty would change if the 
invention were, for example, difficult to destroy because of its size, was very valuable, or created a 
heightened risk for those reporting the infringement. 
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as well as guaranteeing a share for the Arsenal and charity. In other words, 
this analysis illustrates that the Senate used its power to assign the penalty 
to achieve substantially different goals than in the case of the grant of the 
term, which was clearly industry driven. The next subsection briefly 
analyzes possible reasons for the Senate to favor the Water and Energy 
industries over others. 
D. Possible explanations for favoring specific industries 
The Venetian Senate used its customary patent system to provide 
higher incentives for inventions in the Water and Energy industries. As 
explained in the previous subsection, these industries received, on average, 
five to six additional years of protection.135 Why did the Serenissima have 
such a strong interest in the Water and Energy industries compared to other 
industries, such as the Textile industry, which were also of great 
importance to its economy?136 There are three possible reasons for this 
result. The first and the most obvious relates to Venice’s location. Venice is 
built on a lagoon; therefore, any invention that pertained to draining water, 
digging channels, pumping water, and reclaiming swamps, must have been 
of vital importance for the life of Venetian citizens in the 16th Century. 
The second possible reason relates to the specific historical period 
during the 16th century, in which these inventors sought patents at a time 
concurrent with two significant events in Europe. First, the demographic 
pressure became substantial; thereby, leading to the discovery of new ways 
to produce more energy per capita, such as new machines (mills in 
particular) that could produce energy at a lower cost, became essential.137 
Second, deforestation had caused the price of wood to skyrocket.138 Thus, 
finding alternative combustibles or more efficient machines, such as new 
stoves or the use of olive pomace rather than wood, were very important. 
A final possible reason was the risk of failure associated with these 
inventions, particularly, mills.139 Contemporaneous accounts report that the 
 
 135 See supra Part II.C. 
 136 Consider the fact that the range of patented inventions in the last half of the 15th century was very 
wide and included, for example, recipes, chemical formulae for dyeing, furnaces, water pumps, mills, 
fabrics, glass, ceramic, food, etc. See Molà, supra note 24. 
 137 For example, the goal of the patented water mills was often to produce more energy with the same 
amount of water by increasing the rotation speed of the wheel. In Venice, numerous experiments were 
conducted to develop a mill that could use tidal power. See Luca Molà, Energia e Brevetti per Invenzioni 
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success rate of the patented mills was quite low.140 Specifically, they point 
to the cost of operating the new mills, which often turned out to be higher 
than the expected savings as well as the existence of certain structural 
limitations, which could not have been foreseen at the time the patent 
application was examined.141 Moreover, by the end of the 16th century, the 
basic mill technology was well known, and many of these new inventions 
were the result of significant experimentation attempting to improve that 
technology.142 Ultimately, it could have been the case that workable 
improvements for such a well-developed technology were harder to 
develop. In conclusion, the higher risk of failure, combined with the unique 
challenges of the time and location, engendered the need to promote the 
Water and Energy industry over other industries. The remaining issue, 
which will be discussed in the next section, is whether we can use what we 
have learned about the tailoring activity in the patent law of the Venetian 
Republic to inform the way in which we promote innovation and patent 
quality today. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY PATENT PROTECTION 
The Venetian Republic’s patent system seems to have produced a 
number of positive results. For example, historians have reported that 
because of its patent law, Venice transformed itself into a nation of artisans 
and engineers and became the center of technological development in 16th 
Century Europe.143 Moreover, they noted that contemporaneous 
governments adopted the Venetian patent system as a model for their own 
countries; thus, they contributed to the creation of an international market 
for inventions, in which companies were formed to acquire patents in 
different states.144 These patents were used to either develop related 
products or to profit from their transfer to other subjects.145 In turn, this 
process allowed for the dissemination of new technologies throughout 
Europe.146 Therefore, given these outcomes, what can be learned from the 












 143 Molà, supra note 24; LANE, supra note 38. 
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As highlighted in the Introduction, in 2003, Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley explained that “there is no reason to assume that a unitary patent 
system [like the current one] optimally encourages innovation in the wide 
range of diverse industries,”147 because there are significant structural 
differences in how industries innovate.148 Consequently, patent protection 
should be tailored to reflect such differences.149 Specifically, Burk and 
Lemley suggested that courts should use the flexible standards present in 
patent law to protect the needs of the various industries.150 However, they 
also argue that other solutions might be available and, specifically, 
suggested that administrative agencies, such as the USPTO, could achieve 
the same result.151 
This paper describes a historical example in which the tailoring 
activity in patent law was conducted by the issuing authority—the Venetian 
Senate—thereby providing an opportunity to re-examine the relevance of 
the issuing authority’s role within the U.S. patent system and to consider 
whether this role could be redesigned to provide optimal levels of 
incentives to different industries. The relevant literature with respect to the 
current role of the USPTO underlines a striking difference between this 
agency and other administrative agencies, such as the EPA, the SEC, or the 
OSHA.152 In fact, contrary to these other entities, the USPTO does not have 
general regulatory authority and enjoys very limited ability to influence 
policies in patent law.153 This is especially surprising considering the 
significant technical aspect that characterizes patent law and the need to use 
highly specialized information to answer many questions in this area.154 The 
result is that patent law is virtually the only technical field of law in which 
the knowledge accumulated by its administrative agency through years of 
experience is not used to improve the effectiveness of the system. In 
 






 Id at 1577. 
 150 Id. at 1578-79 (Supreme Court precedent provides courts the freedom needed to adapt to 
different innovations in differing industries). 
 151 Id. at 1696. 
 152 See Masur, supra note 6, at 302-04. 
 
153
 Id. at 303. 
 154 Masur criticized courts’ past decisions in patent law. Id. at 278-79 (“In areas of regulation 
ranging from securities, to pharmaceutical drugs, to transportation, to the environment, policymakers 
have turned [] to expert administrative agencies, perhaps because they understood the institutional 
deficiencies of courts. This general trend toward agency policymaking in technical fields comes with 
good reason. Absent input from an agency or the legislature, the federal courts have repeatedly proved 
inadequate to the task of setting sound patent policy. Yet the institutional design for patent law remains 
an outlier. Patent law is a highly technically complex regulatory field controlled entirely by the courts. 
Similarly, the PTO is one of the only federal administrative agencies to lack any semblance of 
substantive rulemaking authority.”). 
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particular, the USPTO information is not used to make the patent system 
more responsive to the specific characteristics and needs of the industries, 
and the subjects operating within them, namely the inventors. 
This is even more surprising if we consider the fact that the Venetian 
patent system after which—to various degrees—virtually all the major 
modern patent systems in the world have been modeled, operated in a 
completely different way. In that context, the knowledge acquired by the 
issuing authority through the reviewing process was the fundamental basis 
for both the decision to grant the patent, assuming that the examination 
showed that specific requirements were present, and the tailoring 
activity.155 Thus, the gathering of all the relevant information about the 
invention was scrupulously pursued by the Senate’s executive departments 
that were assigned to review the patent applications.156 Importantly, to 
accomplish this task, the reviewing departments often requested the 
assistance of interested subjects such as the guilds—the industries of that 
time, or the other executive departments relevant for the subject covered by 
the invention.157 That is, it was not uncommon for the examiners to discuss 
the nature of the invention, its novelty, and whether the invention would 
cause any harm to the community or to the reputation of the Venetian 
products with the guilds or other interested entities. For example, in the 
case of Zorzi Pasqualigo, the invention was a new silk dye, and the 
Proveditori di Commun were assigned to its examination. In their opinion, 
the Proveditori reported that, “in order to produce a sound answer” on the 
whether the invention was novel and would have benefited the Republic, 
they asked both the silk merchants and the dyers to see and evaluate the 
invention.158 Another example is the case of Zuan Maria Terzo, where the 
invention was a new tool used in silk production—”a tool to wrap and 
channel silk [threads].”159 The assigned reviewing department was the 
Cinque Savi alla Mercantia, the Venetian department in charge of 
Commerce.160 However, since the invention involved the silk industry, the 
 
 155 See supra Part I.C. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Zorzi Pasqualigo, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 5, registro 2 (issued on Apr. 1, 
1569) (“[V]olendo fare la debita risposta habbiamo prima fatto intervenire li soprintendenti delli 
mercanti della seda, quali vedute le mostre delli colori apresentate per detto supplicante han detto 
essere vagi, et belli et che quando . . . Ne’ contesti di ciò habbiamo anco voluto udire li tentori sopra 
questa materia . . . .”). 
 159 Zuan Maria Terzo, Cinque Savi alla Mercantia, Prima Serie, Risposte, 139 (It.) (“[T]rattandosi 
dell’arte della seda tanto importante a questa Città habbiamo fatto venir all’officio nostro li 
Proveditori di essa arte, et li habbiamo fatto vedere la presente supplicatione affine che ne 
informassero de alcun contrario che potesse apportar ad essa arte questa nova invenzione . . . .”). 
 160 Id.; see supra Part I.C. 
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Cinque Savi requested the opinion of the Proveditori alla Seta, the 
representatives of the silk administrative department, about whether the 
invention would create any harm to the Venetian silk industry. 
The benefit of these interchanges was clearly the fact that the issuing 
authority had a full understanding of the prior art and of the mechanisms of 
the various industries and their needs. As we have seen, the information 
gathered by the reviewing departments was incorporated into their opinions 
and passed on by the Minor Consiglio to the Senate, which had the 
exclusive authority to decide about the grant and tailoring of protection in 
the specific case.161 Ultimately, it is reasonable to presume that this 
examination of the inventions performed in close connection with all 
subjects that had the highest understanding of the relative technical field, 
including the guilds, not only facilitated the tailoring of patent protection, 
but possibly resulted in the higher quality of the issued patents. As 
mentioned, increasing patent quality and tailoring patent protection have 
been central issues in significant research and debates in recent years. Thus, 
naturally the question becomes whether it would be possible for the modern 
patent office to achieve the same results that the Venetian Senate produced 
working together with all the other subjects involved in the review of 
patents at that time. What might be associated with such activity? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the two 
strongest arguments found in the relevant literature against awarding rule-
making authority to the USPTO. They refer to: 1) the USPTO past 
performance, and 2) the USPTO capture.162 
The first objection alludes to the fact that, if we consider the way in 
which the USPTO has been carrying out its current task of reviewing patent 
applications, we must conclude that this entity should not be entrusted with 
rule-making authority like other administrative agencies because many 
have considered its performance to be suboptimal. However, scholars have 
quickly dismissed this issue by explaining that the USPTO performance, 
like the performance of any other entity, is dependent on its funding and 
that the UPSTO “operates under conditions of limited resources.”163 
 
 161 See supra Part I.C. 
 162 In addition to the PTO experience and the PTO capture, Masur identifies four other possible 
explanations for Congress failing to delegate rule-making authority to the PTO. Ultimately, he 
concludes that path dependence—Congress’ adherence to prior practice due to historical accident, is the 
most likely explanation. The other explanations are: rent-seeking—Congress’s desire to continue 
collecting rents from interest groups; property rights—Congress’s belief that the patent systems 
shouldn’t be governed by rules created by an administrative agency, because patents are property rights; 
statutory vagueness—Congress’s fear that the PTO will take undue liberties given the lack of 
specificity of the Patent Act. See Masur, supra note 6, at 296-04. 
 163 Id. at 300. 
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Consequently, improving the USPTO performance would probably be 
sufficient to allocate more money to it.164 A full analysis of this point is 
beyond the scope of this paper, because very little can be learned from the 
Venetian experience in terms of the resources employed by the issuing 
authority to conduct its activity. As described above, the reviewing of the 
patent applications in Venice was very thorough and involved multiple 
subjects; thus, it must have required substantial resources.165 However, in 
the absence of detailed information in the original documents about the cost 
associated with providing patent protection at that time, no other 
conclusion can be made on this issue. Having said that, it appears 
straightforward that allocating more funding to an agency, such as the 
USPTO, would be beneficial because, at the minimum, it would allow this 
entity to hire better, more qualified employees, which is very likely to 
translate into improved performance. 
The second objection to the USPTO acquiring general regulatory 
authority and being the entity that provides tailored patent protection is 
more complex and refers to the possibility that this agency will be captured 
by private interests.166 However, as has been emphasized, this argument 
does not explain why other administrative agencies have been awarded 
more regulatory power. In fact, nothing seems to differentiate the USPTO 
in terms of agency capture that could justify the discrepancy in the rule-
making authority granted by Congress to other entities.167 
From a different perspective, scholars have also explained that courts 
are generally considered to be less subject to the capture problem.168 Thus, 
the Federal Circuit is considered a much better alternative to the USPTO to 
create policies in patent law.169 However, other scholars have contradicted 
this argument. They explained that external influences extend to courts as 
well, and “that the Federal Circuit itself may have been captured by private 
interests.”170 
In the context of the Venetian example, the problem of agency capture 
would have resulted in the guilds being able to exercise too much power 
over the Senate on decisions relating to patent law. However, as we have 
seen, the Venetian case reveals that rather than being a problem, the close 
 
 164 See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
 165 See supra Part I.C. 
 166 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 106-07; Long, supra note 19, at 1969; Meurer, 
supra note 19, at 686. 
 167 Masur, supra note 6, at 313 (“. . . the PTO fares no worse than the typical administrative 
agency.”). 
 168 Id. at 301-02. 
 169 Tran, supra note 6, at 491. 
 170 Masur, supra note 6, at 313. 
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relationship between the issuing authority and the industries was a positive 
factor.171 In other words, as previously suggested by Sarah Tran, the 
Venetian case seems to indicate that industry lobbying could become an 
element that helps the system rather than harms it.172 That is, if structured 
correctly, the interaction with the interest groups fosters an otherwise 
unlikely use of important information. In Venice, this was made possible 
by the presence of a system in which the information gathered by the 
examiners was certain to reach the decision maker—the Senate. At that 
time, there was no disconnect between those who had the information, the 
examining departments, and those who needed to use that information to 
make important decisions in patent law—the Senate.173 Nevertheless, “no 
disconnect” did not mean the absence of control or review of that 
information. As described above, very often the examination of the 
invention was assigned to multiple executive departments working with 
different guilds.174 
Moreover, the Proveditori di Commun, an agency of general 
competence, was almost always involved in the reviewing process together 
with other specialized departments. As a result, multiple inputs contributed 
to form the full picture on which the Senate conducted its work. 
Furthermore, while it is true that the subjects acquiring the information, the 
reviewing departments, and the subject ultimately making the decisions, the 
Senate, operated “under the same roof,” some distance was built among the 
various subjects involved in examining the patent applications. As 
described above, the information gathered by the administrative 
departments was incorporated into their opinions.175 The Minor Consiglio 
collected these opinions and presented the application to the Senate.176 
Thus, a few “steps” separated the guilds and the Senate. Ultimately, even if 
it appears unlikely that the Senate operated completely independently of 
interest groups, it would have been very difficult for a single guild to 
exercise much power over the Senate’s decision- making in patent law. At 
the same time, it is through this system that the Venetian Republic achieved 
its goal of granting tailored patent protection and high-quality patents for 
more than 300 years. 
 
 171 See supra Part I.C. 
 172 Tran, supra note 6, at 526-27. 
 173 Masur, supra note 6, at 315, 325. 
 174 See supra Part I.C. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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In conclusion, the lessons provided by the Venetian experience, 
combined with the fact that any external influence by interest groups might 
extend to entities other than administrative agencies, seem to indicate that 
some degree of agency capture in relation to the activity of the issuing 
authority might be acceptable. In other words, some degree of industry 
capture might be considered tolerable if it represents the price that we have 
to pay for a better-informed patent system that provides the correct 
incentives to inventors in different industries and produces higher quality 
patents than those currently issued. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In 2003, Burk and Lemley demonstrated that patent protection should 
be tailored to the characteristics of different industries. Prior to this 
research, other scholars argued in favor of tailored patent protection. 
However, only after Burk and Lemley’s article did significant debate 
emerge on the tailoring of patent protection, and related to that, increasing 
patent quality. The most significant source of disagreement in this context 
revolves around the entity that should be entrusted with the authority to 
provide tailored patent protection—the Federal Circuit or the USPTO. This 
paper reveals that historically, the tailoring of patent protection had been 
provided by the Venetian Republic for over 300 years. In that case, the 
issuing authority—the Senate—granted tailored protection in each case. 
Using original documents from the Venice State Archive, this paper 
reveals that between the 15th and 18th centuries, the Venetian Republic 
provided patent protection based on the characteristics of the invention as 
well as its industry. In particular, toward the end of the 16th century, it 
granted a higher level of protection to inventions in the Water and Energy 
industry compared to inventions in other industries. 
The Venetian Republic achieved the goal of promoting specific 
industries over others through its customary patent system, which allowed 
the Senate to grant different terms and penalties to different inventions. 
Specifically, between 1560 and 1580, the Senate granted, on average, five 
to seven additional years of protection to inventions in the Water and 
Energy industry compared to others. On the other hand, the grant of the 
penalties was used to cover the costs of possible infringements. 
Therefore, what can we learn from the Venetian experience that could 
inform the modern debate on patent law? As mentioned, the tailoring and 
reviewing activities in Venice were conducted by the issuing authority. 
Consequently, this study represents an opportunity to re-evaluate the 
relevance of the issuing authority’s role within our patent system. It 
provides a rationale for considering the specific changes that should be 
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made to increase the USPTO’s regulatory authority and begin investigating 
if our patent office’s role could be redesigned to optimize the level of 
incentives provided to different industries. 
In the literature, the two most significant objections to an increased 
role of the USPTO within the patent system and, in particular, to vest this 
entity with general regulatory authority that could be used to provide 
tailored patent protection, are past performance and the risk of agency 
capture. As emphasized by other scholars, this paper argues that the 
USPTO’s past performance could be significantly improved with better 
funding.177 Moreover, it presents the Venetian case to show that, 
historically, the agency capture problem has been managed and that the 
close interaction with the industries has been used to benefit the system 
rather than to harm it. In Venice, the Senate and its executive departments 
used the interaction with the guilds to improve the way in which tailored 
protection was provided; they used the guilds’ knowledge to their 
advantage. Ultimately, it is reasonable to believe that this better-informed 
system not only provided better incentives to the inventors, but also 
resulted in very high-quality patents. 
In conclusion, additional research is necessary to fully determine how 
the Venetian example can be used to improve the current system. However, 
this paper presents a very strong case favoring a more significant role of the 
USPTO within the patent system in view of the relevant experience and 
specialized knowledge that was well understood in the Venetian Republic 
to facilitate the Republic’s efficient and effective administration of patent 
rights. Moreover, in other areas, Congress has chosen to entrust 
administrative agencies with substantial rule- making authority. It is now 
time for the same result to be achieved in patent law as well. 
 
APPENDIX 
The conclusion discussed in Part II.C is the result of a statistical 
hypothesis test carried out according to the following steps: 
Null and alternative hypotheses. For each pair of industries (namely, 
population 1 and population 2), a null (HO) and alternative (H1) hypotheses 
were stated as follows: The null hypothesis, which is a contradiction of the 
result to be proved, was that the two industries had the same mean. The 
alternative hypothesis was that the two industries had different means. 
Test statistic. The test statistic for the difference of two population means is: 
 
 177 Masur, supra note 6, at 300. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
342 
where: 
x1: sample mean of population 1 
x2: sample mean of population 2 
µ1: mean of population 1 
µ2: mean of population 2 
a-1: sample standard deviation of population 1 a-2: sample standard deviation 
of population 2 n1: sample size of population 1 
n2: sample size of population 2 
The test statistic, t, is assumed to have a student’s t probability distribution 
function with a number of degrees of freedom, df, given by: 
 
Significance level. The significance level was chosen at 90% (a = 0.1) in order 
to define the probability threshold (p-value). 
Results. The null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
according to the following tables. 
Main case 
In the main case the patent granted to Fedele Piccolomini was 
excluded from the dataset. 
Terms: 
 
Table 1. Averages and standard deviations. 
  
 Average Standard deviation 
Count Percentage 
Agriculture 23.57 5.56 7 4.54% 
Construction 21.88 5.12 16 10.39% 
Chemistry 22.50 7.58 6 3.90% 
Energy 28.08 13.16 39 25.32% 
Food 23.89 6.01 9 5.84% 
Other 21.47 7.02 17 11.04% 
Textiles 21.67 4.20 18 11.69% 
Water 28.57 13.54 42 27.27% 
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Table 2. Test statistic values. 
 
Table 3. p-values. 
 
Table 4. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to reject 




 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0.69 -1.51 -1.51 -0.11 0.78 0.82 -1.70 
Construction -0.69  -0.19 -2.51 -0.85 0.19 0.13 -2.76 
Chemistry -0.29 0.19  -1.49 -0.38 0.29 0.26 -1.63 
Energy 1.51 2.51 1.49  1.44 2.44 2.75 -0.17 
Food 0.11 0.85 0.38 -1.44  0.92 0.99 -1.63 
Other -0.78 -0.19 -0.29 -2.44 -0.92  -0.10 -2.65 
Textiles -0.82 -0.13 -0.26 -2.75 -0.99 0.10  -3.02 
Water 1.70 2.76 1.63 0.17 1.63 2.65 3.02  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
 Water Energy Food Agriculture Chemistry Construction Textile Other 
Agriculture  1.35 1.36 -1.32 -1.34 1.34 1.37 -1.32 
Construction -1.35  -1.39 -1.30 -1.34 1.31 1.31 -1.30 
Chemistry -1.36 1.39  -1.35 -1.36 1.37 1.41 -1.36 
Energy 1.32 1.30 1.35  1.31 1.30 1.30 -1.29 
Food 1.34 1.34 1.36 -1.31  1.32 1.35 -1.31 
Other -1.34 -1.31 -1.37 -1.30 -1.32  -1.31 -1.30 
Textiles -1.37 -1.31 -1.41 -1.30 -1.35 -1.31  -1.30 
Water 1.32 1.30 1.36 1.29 1.31 1.30 1.30  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Construction 0  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Chemistry 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 
Food 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Other 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
Textiles 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 
Water 1 1 1 0 1 1 1  




Table 5. Averages and standard deviations. 
 
Table 6. Test statistic values. 
Table 7. p-values. 
Table 8. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Count Percentage 
Agriculture 270.00 164.32 7 4.54% 
Construction 340.63 285.90 16 10.39% 
Chemistry 300.00 234.52 6 3.90% 
Energy 308.33 138.10 39 25.32% 
Food 403.13 316.35 9 5.84% 
Other 343.57 239.80 17 11.04% 
Textiles 247.22 121.84 18 11.69% 
Water 361.83 236.54 42 27.27% 
 Food Water Other Construction Energy Chemistry Agriculture Textile 
Food 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Energy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Chemistry 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Agriculture 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Textile 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Food Water Other Construction Energy Chemistry Agriculture Textile 
Food  -0.75 -0.26 -0.58 -1.09 -0.86 0.33 -1.28 
Water 0.75  0.34 0.43 -0.49 -0.03 1.21 -0.26 
Other 0.26 -0.34  -0.08 -0.72 -0.39 0.53 -0.60 
Construction 0.58 -0.43 0.08  -0.88 -0.57 1.69 -1.26 
Energy 1.09 0.49 0.72 0.88  0.49 1.43 0.37 
Chemistry 0.86 0.03 0.39 0.57 -0.49  1.49 -0.27 
Agriculture -0.33 -1.21 -0.53 -1.69 -1.43 -1.49  -2.49 
Textile 1.28 0.26 0.60 1.26 -0.37 0.27 2.49  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  -1.32 -1.37 -1.38 -1.34 -1.33 1.37 -1.35 
Construction 1.32  1.35 1.33 -1.33 -1.31 1.32 -1.32 
Chemistry 1.37 -1.35  -1.42 -1.34 -1.37 1.41 -1.40 
Energy 1.38 -1.33 1.42  -1.37 -1.32 1.30 -1.29 
Food 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.37  1.34 1.37 1.36 
Other 1.33 1.31 1.37 1.32 1.34  1.32 -1.31 
Textiles -1.37 -1.32 -1.41 -1.30 -1.37 -1.32  -1.30 
Water 1.35 1.32 1.40 1.29 1.36 1.31 1.30  
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Piccolomini ten year case 
In the Piccolomini ten year case the patent granted to Fedele 
Piccolomini was assigned a term of ten years. 
 
Terms: 
Table 9. Averages and standard deviations. 
Table 10. Test statistic values. 
Table 11. p-values. 
  
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Count Percentage 
Agriculture 23.57 5.56 7 4.52% 
Construction 21.88 5.12 16 10.32% 
Chemistry 22.50 7.58 6 3.87% 
Energy 28.08 13.16 39 25.16% 
Food 23.89 6.01 9 5.81% 
Other 21.47 7.02 17 10.97% 
Textiles 21.67 4.20 18 11.61% 
Water 28.14 13.67 43 27.74% 
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0.69 -1.51 -1.51 -0.11 0.78 0.82 -1.54 
Construction -0.69  -0.19 -2.51 -0.85 0.19 0.13 -2.56 
Chemistry -0.29 0.19  -1.49 -0.38 0.29 0.26 -1.51 
Energy 1.51 2.51 1.49  1.44 2.44 2.75 -0.02 
Food 0.11 0.85 0.38 -1.44  0.92 0.99 -1.47 
Other -0.78 -0.19 -0.29 -2.44 -0.92  -0.10 -2.48 
Textiles -0.82 -0.13 -0.26 -2.75 -0.99 0.10  -2.80 
Water 1.54 2.56 1.51 0.02 1.47 2.48 2.80  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
 Water Energy Food Agriculture Chemistry Construction Textile Other 
Agriculture  1.35 1.36 -1.32 -1.34 1.34 1.37 -1.32 
Construction -1.35  -1.39 -1.30 -1.34 1.31 1.31 -1.30 
Chemistry -1.36 1.39  -1.35 -1.36 1.37 1.41 -1.35 
Energy 1.32 1.30 1.35  1.31 1.30 1.30 -1.29 
Food 1.34 1.34 1.36 -1.31  1.32 1.35 -1.31 
Other -1.34 -1.31 -1.37 -1.30 -1.32  -1.31 -1.30 
Textiles -1.37 -1.31 -1.41 -1.30 -1.35 -1.31  -1.30 
Water 1.32 1.30 1.35 1.29 1.31 1.30 1.30  
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Table 12. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Piccolomini sixty year case 
In the Piccolomini sixty year case the patent granted to Fedele 
Piccolomini was assigned a term of sixty years. 
 
Terms: 
Table 13. Averages and standard deviations. 
 
Table 14. Test statistic values. 
 
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Construction 0  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Chemistry 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 
Food 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Other 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
Textiles 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 
Water 1 1 1 0 1 1 1  
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Count Percentage 
Agriculture 23.57 5.56 7 4.52% 
Construction 21.88 5.12 16 10.32% 
Chemistry 22.50 7.58 6 3.87% 
Energy 28.08 13.16 39 25.16% 
Food 23.89 6.01 9 5.81% 
Other 21.47 7.02 17 10.97% 
Textiles 21.67 4.20 18 11.61% 
Water 29.30 14.21 43 27.74% 
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0.69 -1.51 -1.51 -0.11 0.78 0.82 -1.90 
Construction -0.69  -0.19 -2.51 -0.85 0.19 0.13 -2.95 
Chemistry -0.29 0.19  -1.49 -0.38 0.29 0.26 -1.80 
Energy 1.51 2.51 1.49  1.44 2.44 2.75 -0.41 
Food 0.11 0.85 0.38 -1.44  0.92 0.99 -1.83 
Other -0.78 -0.19 -0.29 -2.44 -0.92  -0.10 -2.84 
Textiles -0.82 -0.13 -0.26 -2.75 -0.99 0.10  -3.21 
Water 1.90 2.95 1.80 0.41 1.83 2.84 3.21  
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Table 15. p-values. 
Table 16. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Piccolomini eighty year case 
In the Piccolomini eighty year case the patent granted to Fedele 









 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
 Water Energy Food Agriculture Chemistry Construction Textile Other 
Agriculture  1.35 1.36 -1.32 -1.34 1.34 1.37 -1.32 
Construction -1.35  -1.39 -1.30 -1.34 1.31 1.31 -1.30 
Chemistry -1.36 1.39  -1.35 -1.36 1.37 1.41 -1.35 
Energy 1.32 1.30 1.35  1.31 1.30 1.30 -1.29 
Food 1.34 1.34 1.36 -1.31  1.32 1.35 -1.31 
Other -1.34 -1.31 -1.37 -1.30 -1.32  -1.31 -1.30 
Textiles -1.37 -1.31 -1.41 -1.30 -1.35 -1.31  -1.30 
Water 1.32 1.30 1.35 1.29 1.31 1.30 1.30  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Construction 0  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Chemistry 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 
Food 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Other 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
Textiles 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 
Water 1 1 1 0 0 0 0  
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Count Percentage 
Agriculture 23.57 5.56 7 4.52% 
Construction 21.88 5.12 16 10.32% 
Chemistry 22.50 7.58 6 3.87% 
Energy 28.08 13.16 39 25.16% 
Food 23.89 6.01 9 5.81% 
Other 21.47 7.02 17 10.97% 
Textiles 21.67 4.20 18 11.61% 
Water 29.76 15.50 43 27.74% 
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Table 18. Test statistic values. 
 
Table 19. p-values. 
 
Table 20. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0.69 -1.51 -1.51 -0.11 0.78 0.82 -1.96 
Construction -0.69  -0.19 -2.51 -0.85 0.19 0.13 -2.93 
Chemistry -0.29 0.19  -1.49 -0.38 0.29 0.26 -1.87 
Energy 1.51 2.51 1.49  1.44 2.44 2.75 -0.53 
Food 0.11 0.85 0.38 -1.44  0.92 0.99 -1.90 
Other -0.78 -0.19 -0.29 -2.44 -0.92  -0.10 -2.85 
Textiles -0.82 -0.13 -0.26 -2.75 -0.99 0.10  -3.16 
Water 1.96 2.93 1.87 0.53 1.90 2.85 3.16  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
 Water Energy Food Agriculture Chemistry Construction Textile Other 
Agriculture  1.35 1.36 -1.32 -1.34 1.34 1.37 -1.31 
Construction -1.35  -1.39 -1.30 -1.34 1.31 1.31 -1.30 
Chemistry -1.36 1.39  -1.35 -1.36 1.37 1.41 -1.34 
Energy 1.32 1.30 1.35  1.31 1.30 1.30 -1.29 
Food 1.34 1.34 1.36 -1.31  1.32 1.35 -1.31 
Other -1.34 -1.31 -1.37 -1.30 -1.32  -1.31 -1.30 
Textiles -1.37 -1.31 -1.41 -1.30 -1.35 -1.31  -1.30 
Water 1.31 1.30 1.34 1.29 1.31 1.30 1.30  
 Agriculture Construction Chemistry Energy Food Other Textile Water 
Agriculture  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Construction 0  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Chemistry 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 
Food 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Other 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
Textiles 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 
Water 1 1 1 0 0 0 0  
